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TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AS THREE-TIERED REVIEW
MARK W. CORDES*
I. INTRODUCTION

Takings jurisprudence has long been and remains, in the opinion of
many, a constitutional quagmire, with little in the way of predictable results
or coherent principles.' The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the
largely ad hoc nature of its takings analysis, emphasizing the fact-sensitive
nature of takings decisions and its reluctance to articulate precise formulae
in this area.2 Moreover, although articulating a variety of standards and
'4
' 3
tests, such as "investment-backed expectations and "economic viability,
the Court has not clearly stated their relation to each other or their precise
meanings. 5 This has led a number of commentators to lament these unclear
standards, labeling this area of law an unworkable "muddle," 6 a "jumble of

Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
Commentary on the less than clear state of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence is
voluminous. See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET. AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 514-17 (2 nd ed. 1993)

(lack of consistent standards has led to confusion); Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings
Personally: The Perils of (Mis)reasoningby Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1355, 1355 (2000) ("profound
puzzle"); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: InstitutionalAnalysis and the Problem of Takings, 92
Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (1998) ("The doctrine remains in perplexing disarray"). The Texas
Supreme Court has referred to takings jurisprudence as a "sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog."
Sheffield Dev.
Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted).
2
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
3The Supreme Court first identified the "extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations" as a significant factor in takings analysis in Penn Central,438
U.S. at 124. Recent decisions have continued to recognize the importance of this factor, at least where
regulated property retains some economic viability and therefore does not constitute a categorical
taking. See4 Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 327 n23; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
The Court began using the term economic viability in a series of decisions in the 1980s,
often stating that a land use restriction constitutes a taking if it "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." See, e.g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
5Commentators have noted the ambiguous nature of both standards. See, e.g., Lynda J.
Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in
Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 120-27 (1995) (discussing various ambiguities in the
economically viable use standard); John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-FactorTest Ready for
History's Dustbin?, 52 Land Use & Zoning Dig. Is. I at 6 (Jan. 2000) (discussing ambiguous nature of
"investment-backed expectations"); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings
Law, 27 URB.
6 LAW 215, 215 (1995).

j. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22

ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102 (1995).
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confusing holdings,"7 an "enduring
legal dilemma, ' and a state of
9
disarray."
"doctrinal and conceptual
What is sometimes lost in the lament,' ° however, is the degree to
which the Court has established, with some clarity, three distinct types of
takings concerns and three analytical approaches in resolving them. Thus,
despite continued ambiguity on some details, the "big picture" of takings
jurisprudence is shaping up rather nicely and in a way that is quite sensible.
This has been particularly true in the last several decades, where in a
number of decisions the Court has fleshed out the broad outlines of
differing levels of takings review. Although these decisions are often seen
as reflecting a growing protection of property rights," they in fact establish
several distinct levels of protection depending upon the type of takings
issue posed. As a practical matter, these distinct approaches provide
heightened protection for landowners when autonomy and fairness concerns
are present, but provide substantial latitude for government to regulate
property for environmental and other purposes.
This past term, in Lingle v. Chevron,12 the Court again took an
important, albeit small, step in clarifying the takings doctrine when it held
that the "substantially advances" test from Agins v. Tiburon13 is not part of
the takings analysis.' 4 As noted by the Court, that language had become
"ensconced" in takings cases over the past two decades, 5 yet as a practical
matter had not played a role in any takings decisions and is inappropriate
for takings analysis. Whereas takings concerns focus on "the magnitude
and character of the burden a particular regulation imposes on private
7

James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENVTL.
L. 143, 144 (1997).
sOswald, supra note 5 at 92.
9Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 1301, 1304 (1989).
10Most commentators have been critical of what is perceived as the confusing and
ambiguous state of takings doctrine, but one recent article argues that the vagueness of takings
jurisprudence is actually desirable. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine,
24 Cardozo L. Rev. 93 (2002). In a very thoughtful article, Professor Poirer argues that the vagueness
of takings doctrine serves important societal purposes.
" Landowners have prevailed in the majority of decisions since the Supreme Court began
reviewing takings cases with some regularity in 1987. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 714-15 (1999) (concluding that repeated
denials of development requests constituted a taking); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(establishing "rough proportionality" standard for development exactions); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 (1992) (finding that a regulation depriving landowner of all economically
viable use constitutes a taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); (requiring
an "essential nexus" between exactions and development impacts); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987) (requiring just compensation for the period
between enactment of a regulation and the final judicial determination that a taking has occurred).
",125 S.Ct. 2074, 2082-83 (2005).
13Id. at 2082 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
14Id. at 2078.
" Id. at 2077-78.
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property rights,"' 16 an ends/means test examines a regulation's effectiveness
in achieving a legitimate purpose. 17 For this reason, takings jurisprudence
is governed by tests designed to examine the magnitude of burdens and the
character of actions and to address the fundamental questions of "fairness
and justice." The Court stated that takings jurisprudence is largely
governed by three inquiries 18 drawn from Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,19 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,20 and
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.21 The first two
inquiries concern the relatively rare instances of categorical takings, but the
third inquiry is a multi-factor balancing test designed to address the
majority of takings questions. The Court acknowledged, however, that an
additional takings inquiry existed for exaction cases, 22 thus bringing to four
the actual number of inquiries governing takings cases.
The four tests identified in Lingle actually govern three distinct
types of takings recognized by the Court: physical invasions, excessive
development exactions, and unfair economic burdens from land use
regulations. It is the thesis of this article that current takings analysis can
be viewed as reflecting a three-tiered level of review, roughly analogous to
the three levels of equal protection review,23 that correspond to the three
types of takings that might occur. Where government action results in a
physical invasion, the Court will strictly scrutinize the activity, a pplying a
test from Loretto that results in a nearly per se finding of a taking. Where
the government requires an exaction as part of development approval, the
Court applies a "rough proportionality" standard from Dolan v. City of
Tigard25 that is analogous to intermediate review. Finally, in the typical
regulatory situation in which the government merely restricts future land
uses, the Court applies a two-part "economic impact" test drawn from
26
Lucas and Penn Central.
Although this standard occasionally results in
16Id. at 2084.
I7 at 2083.
Id.
1d.at 2081-82.
'p458 U.S. 419 (1982).

20 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
21 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
22 See Lingle, 125 S. Ct.

at 2086.
Commentators generally have recognized that the Supreme Court applies three levels of
scrutiny in equal protection cases, usually depending upon the classifications drawn. See, e.g., ERWIN
23

d

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645-47 (2" ed. 2002); KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601-04 (14d ed. 2001).

24458 U.S. at 438.
25 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
26 The Court's approach

to evaluating whether the economic impact of a regulation

constitutes a taking is a two-step standard. It first asks whether the restriction deprives the landowner of
all economic viability. If the answer is yes, then it is a categorical taking. If some economic viability
remains, then the regulation is analyzed under a three-part balancing test derived from Penn Central.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1482-84 (2002);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615-18 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 & 1019 n. 8 (1992).
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the finding of a taking, as a practical matter it is highly deferential and
permits substantial restrictions on property owners.
The analogy to the three tiers of equal protection review is only a
rough one, of course, and is not intended to suggest similar types of
analysis. The three types of equal protection review each largely apply the
same type of means/ends analysis, but they require different strengths of
interest and precision of means, depending on the level of scrutiny being
applied. 27 The three levels of takings scrutiny, however, differ substantially
in the tests used, not only in comparison to equal protection analysis but
also in relation to each other. Nonetheless, the comparison of the different
levels of scrutiny is appropriate. Like equal protection review, takings
analysis can involve strict, intermediate, or deferential scrutiny, depending
on the interests involved.
From this perspective the differing levels of scrutiny reflect
understandable societal values on how the balance between private and
public interests in land should be struck. As is commonly noted, property
ownership involves both individual and communal dimensions, which
themselves reflect several distinct policy concerns.2 8 As it has developed,
the takings clause operates to balance the interests of individual and
community as it relates to property ownership. 29 Thus, the Court applies
strict scrutiny in those instances where individual interests are paramount,
while applying deferential standards where community concerns are more
clearly implicated. In particular, the role of property in protecting
individual autonomy has been primary in strict scrutiny, while "fairness"

three levels of equal protection review all require that the challenged government
action relate to some recognized interest. The different scrutiny applied at each level turns on the degree
of required relationship and the strength or importance of the asserted government interest. Thus, mere
rationality review involving the lowest degree of scrutiny only requires that the challenged action be
rationally related to some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1973). Intermediate scrutiny requires that government actions be "substantially related"
to "important government objectives." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Strict scrutiny
requires that government actions must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
28 A large number of commentators have noted that private property is subject to broader
public interests. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson PrivateProperty, Public Rights,
and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 271-82 (1996); Jerry L. Anderson,
Takings and Expectations: Toward a "Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 529,
535 (1989); Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation,Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Rule for
Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095 (1996).
29Viewing the takings clause as balancing individual and community interests was implicit
in the Court's initial recognition of regulatory takings in Pensylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). The Court acknowledged that government could not go on if it had to pay every time its
regulations reduced the value of land. Id. at 413. On the other hand, the Court stated that if a regulation
"goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. The Court also concluded the opinion with
the observation that "the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall."
Id. at 416.
27 The
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concerns have largely dictated scrutiny for the intermediate and deferential
levels of scrutiny.
Characterizing the physical invasion and the exaction takings tests
as forms of strict and intermediate scrutiny should strike most people as
sensible. Characterizing the two-part Lucas and Penn Central tests as
reflecting deferential review, however, might be surprising, and even a little
odd, to some. The Court itself has never referred to the tests in this manner,
and the Penn Central test in particular calls for a careful balancing of
concerns not typically found with deferential review. Moreover, some
commentators have viewed the Court's recent takings jurisprudence as
overly protective of property rights and as posing a threat to environmental
land use regulations3 - hardly deferential review. Yet viewed form a broad
perspective, in which takings jurisprudence essentially balances the rights
of individuals and community in how land is used, the Lucas-Penn Central
analysis is highly deferential to the government's ability to restrict the use
of land for the broader public good. It is true that on rare occasions these
tests will result in finding land use restrictions invalid, and therefore they
might be viewed as deferential review "with some teeth." However, from a
broad perspective, government is given substantial latitude in regulating
land, thus suggesting deferential scrutiny.
This article will review current takings jurisprudence as reflected in
these three levels of scrutiny. Part I will briefly review the development of
the Supreme Court takings doctrine. The next three parts of the article will
then examine the three types of takings concerns and the three levels of
scrutiny that are used, examining both the types of analysis applied and the
rationales supporting the particular level of scrutiny.
H. BACKGROUND

Modern takings analysis began with the seminal case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,31 where the Supreme Court first
established that the mere regulation of property might constitute a taking.
In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court reviewed a state statute that prohibited the
mining of anthracite coal when subsidence damage might result. 32 The
effect of the statute was to force coal companies to keep a portion of the
30

See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds ofNuisance and the Takings Clause, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1993) (possible effect of Lucas is to stunt legislative protection against
harmful land uses); Daniel A. Crane, Comment, Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 199, 201 (1996) ("The Rehnquist Court has begun to reinvigorate the
Takings Clause, much to the joy of property rights activists and to the dismay of environmentalists");
Michael C. Blumm, Property Myths, JudicialActivism and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL. L. 907, 914
(1993) (stating that Lucas "might help to establish the Constitution as an unfortunate restraint on the
ability of environmental and land use regulation to control the adverse effects of development").
3 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
31Id. at 412-13.
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coal in the ground. Although the Court acknowledged that government
could not go on if it had to pay every time its regulations reduced the value
of land,33 it stated that if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. 4 The Court concluded that the statute had indeed "gone too far"
and therefore constituted a taking, but failed to explain that conclusion
other than to state that the statute made the mining of anthracite coal
"commercially impracticable. 35
Despite the lack of precision in the Court's analysis, Pennsylvania
Coal did recognize two important principles for understanding the balance
of private and public interests in land use. First, it confirmed that land can
be subject to regulations, even when it results in lost value, in order to
pursue legitimate government purposes.36 Conversely, a taking occurs if
the regulation "goes too far" or if the economic impact is of too great a
magnitude.37 Under this embryonic "economic impact" analysis, private
interests must necessarily yield to the public good to a certain extent. At
some point, however, the degree of economic impact becomes so great that
the private interest must be protected. Although the Court gave almost no
guidance in discerning when this point is reached, it said that the question is
ultimately one of fairness and where the burden of regulation should lie.38
This, in essence, involves a balancing of interests, determining where
community concerns should end and private interests begin.
Despite the significance of its holding in Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court gave relatively little attention to the takings clause for more than half
a century. The one notable exception was in the area of what has come to
be known as "physical invasions," where the Court in several cases applied
a near per se rule that government activity that results in a physical invasion
of private property is a per se taking. 39 Building on case law that long
predated Pennsylvania Coal,40 the Court held that physical invasions
constituted takings because they interfered with the right to exclude others.
In so doing the Court gave little attention to the economic impact of the
activity, instead finding that any interference with the right to exclude
others constituted a taking.

33
34 1d.

at 413.
1d. at 415.
35
36 ld. at 414.
1d. at 413.
3Id. at 415.
3
39 ld. at 416.
See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding that government
seizure of coal mine during war constituted a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(holding that overhead flights constituted a taking).
40See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (cited in United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946)).
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Other than the physical invasion cases, the Court gave little
attention to takings concerns again until its 1978 decision in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City,4 1 in which it reviewed the validity of
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law. The effect of the law, as
applied to Penn Central's property, was to eliminate or to reduce greatly the
pre-existing and quite valuable air rights owned by Penn Central.42 In
finding the law valid, the Court began its analysis by noting it had
previously eschewed any "set formula" for takings concerns, instead
deciding takings claims on an essentially ad hoc basis. 43 It then identified
several factors in determining whether a taking occurred, including the
nature of the government action, the diminution in value, and the degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations. 44 On this basis the Court
held that the Landmark Preservation Law was not a taking as applied to
Penn Central's property, emphasizing that the regulation still permitted a
reasonable return on the land and that the regulation did not interfere with
what had been the primary expectations of the landowner.45
Although Penn Centralaffirmed the basic holding of Pennsylvania
Coal - that land use regulations serving a legitimate government purpose
might still constitute a taking if the economic impact is too severe 4 - in
several respects it suggested a quite deferential approach in assessing the
economic impact issue. First, the Court clearly held that, in assessing the
regulation's economic impact, the parcel is considered as a whole rather
than examining only that portion subject to the regulation.4 7 Second, in
assessing the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations,
the Court emphasized that the landmark law did not prevent Penn Central
from using the land as originally purchased and as it had been previously
used. 48 Thus, even though the law eliminated more intensive development
4 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
42 In Penn Central, the City of New York, pursuant to its Landmark Preservation Law,
designated Grand Central Terminal, owned by Penn Central, as a "landmark." As a consequence, Penn
Central could not make any exterior changes to the terminal, even if consistent with applicable zoning
regulations, without prior approval of the Landmark Preservation Commission. Penn Central sought
approval of two alternative plans to build either a 53 or 55 story addition on top of the terminal. The
Commission rejected both plans. In response, Penn Central challenged the application of the Landmark
Preservation Law as a taking. Id. at 115-19.
43Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
44id.
45
1d. at 136.
4Id. at 127-8.
47"'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular government action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." Id. at 13031.
48The Court stated that Grand Central Terminal had "been used for the previous 65 years: as
a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions." For that reason the Court said the
Landmark Preservation Law did not "interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel." Id. at 136.
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opportunities previously permitted by zoning, the assurance of a reasonable
return on the property viewed as a whole and the continuation of previous
uses negated takings concerns.49
In the opinion of many, Penn Central's more deferential approach
to takings analysis has been turned on its head in recent years, with the
Court deciding a number of regulatory takings cases almost always in favor
of landowners. Indeed, starting in 1987 with its famous takings trilogy,50
the Court has decided eight major regulatory land use cases, with property
owners prevailing in six of the decisions.5' Moreover, the Court has at
times used language emphasizing a resolve to protect property rights, even
on one occasion favorably comparing them to liberties such as speech. 2
These decisions have therefore been understandably received with some
concern by the environmental community, elicitin§ concerns over the future
of environmental regulation and land use controls.
Despite the undeniable shift toward greater protection of property
rights that these cases represent, as a practical matter the cases are a far cry
49 Id.

so The 1987 takings trilogy, which arguably signaled the Court's active reentry into the
takings arena, consisted of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
51Property owners prevailed in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 314 (1987). The government prevailed in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass "n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
There have been several other takings cases decided during this period, but they do not
directly involve the primary issues raised in a regulatory land use context. For example, this past term
the Court decided three important takings cases, but none directly dealt with the substance of regulatory
land use. In Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005), the Court clarified the "public
use" requirement for exercise of eminent domain. In San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San
Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (2005), the Court held it will not create an exception to the federal full
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, for land use litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims
in federal court. In Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005), the Court clarified that the Agins
"substantially related to a legitimate interest" test is not part of the regulatory takings analysis. This
holding certainly applies to regulatory land use cases, yet the case itself did not involve a land use
regulation and the Court never addressed how the core taking analysis should apply in the case.
52See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392 (stating that the takings clause should not be "relegated to the
status of a poor relation" to the First and Fourth Amendments).
53 See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1993) (stating the possible effect of Lucas is to stunt legislative protection
against harmful land uses); Marilyn Phelan, The Current Status of Historical Preservation Law in
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence: Has the Lucas "Missile" Dismantled Preservation Programs?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 785, 787 (1995) (stating that Dolan and Lucas "raise questions whether the
Court has indeed adopted a more expansive course" in its takings analysis that might have a profound
impact on historic preservation programs); Daniel A. Crane, Comment, A Poor Relation? Regulatory
Takings After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 199, 201 (1996) ("[The Rehnquist Court has
begun to reinvigorate the Takings Clause, much to the joy of property rights activists and to the dismay
of environmentalists").
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from an elevation of property interests over environmental concerns.
Rather, they suggest a balanced treatment of the relationship between
private and public interests, with the scrutiny applied turning on the type of
taking problem presented. Although the decisions confirm and establish
what might be viewed as heightened and intermediate scrutiny for certain
government acts, they continued to affirm a generally deferential approach
for the vast majority of land use regulations.
The Court's treatment of takings might be best treated by
examining five of the recent decisions - Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,54 Dolan v. City of Tigard,"5 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 56 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,57 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.58 In Nollan, one of the 1987
decisions, the Court addressed whether a taking occurs when development
approval is conditioned on a landowner first providing a physical dedication
of land, where the dedication is unrelated to the development.5 9
Emphasizing the Court's longstanding concern for physical invasions of
property,6 the Court held that such exactions would be valid only if there is
an "essential nexus" between the required dedication and the asserted state
interest that would justify denial of the development in the first instance.6'
On that basis, the Court struck down an exaction that required the owner of
beachfront property, who wanted to build a larger house, to dedicate an
easement to the public along the beach. The Court found the exaction
invalid, stating there was no relationship between it and purported concerns
that the house would block views from the road.62 The Court did not
answer the question of how much of a relationship is needed, noting that
under the facts before it the exaction was completely unrelated to the
developmental impact.63

U.S. 825 (1987).
" 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
U.S. 1003 (1992).
5 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
58535 U.S. 302 (2002).
'9483 U.S. at 827-29. In Nollan, the owners of a small house on the Pacific coast sought a
"coastal development permit" from the California Coastal Commission in order to demolish the house
and replace it with a larger one. The Commission approved the permit contingent on the Nollans
granting a public easement across their property between the high tide mark and a seawall. After an
administrative hearing upheld the grant of the easement as a prerequisite to permit approval, the Nollans
challenged the easement requirement as a taking.
'4483

16 505

6

Id.at 831.

61 Id. at
62

837.
Id. at 838. The Coastal Commission had tried to defend the easement requirement on the
basis that the larger house would interfere with "visual access" to the beach for people on the road and
in turn create a "psychological barrier" to use of the beach for those on the road. The Court found no
was quite impossible to
nexus at all between these problems and the required easement, stating "[i]t
understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacle to viewing the beach created by the new house."
6 Id.
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The question of how much of a relationship is required was
answered seven years later in Dolan v. City of Tigard,64 where the Court
again considered the validity of a development exaction requirement. In
that case, the city had conditioned approval to double the size of an existing
store upon two exactions, one for a pedestrian/bike path and the other for a
greenway development. 65 In evaluating the validity of the exactions, the
Court adopted a test requiring "rough proportionality" between the exaction
and developmental impacts.6 In particular, the Court stated that, although
precise calculations are not required, "the city must make some sort of
individual determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 67 Under this
standard, both exactions were found to be invalid, the Court noting that the
city had failed to show proportionality with either.68
Together, Nollan and Dolan established the applicability of takings
analysis to the increasingly important practice of development exactions.
In so doing, however, the Court carved out a unique analytical approach
distinct from that previously applied in either the physical invasion or
regulatory takings areas. Although the "rough proportionality" standard
calls for a level of scrutiny typically not seen with land use regulations,
neither does it require the exactitude one might expect from strict scrutiny.
Indeed, the decisions clearly affirm the validity of development exactions
as a land control technique, but simply require that exactions relate to and
flow from the development in question. As a practical matter it established
what might be viewed as an intermediate standard of scrutiny - a
characterization the Court itself suggested when adopting the standard.69
As important as Nollan and Dolan were, they concerned the more
focused practice of development exactions, rather than the broader
6

512 U.S 374 (1994).

1Id.at 380.

66Id.at 391.
67 Id.

6'With regard to the greenway dedication, the Court acknowledged that restricting

development in the floodplain would help confine the increased stormwater runoff created by the store
expansion. However, the Court said the city failed to explain why a public, rather than a private,
greenway was necessary. Both would equally serve to address the problem of increased stormwater run
off. Thus, the additional requirement of a physical dedication of the property, which would intrude on
the Dolans' right to exclude others, was altogether unrelated to the problems posed by the development.
Id at 392-95. The Court similarly acknowledged that a larger store might increase traffic, but the city
made no effort to show how the required dedication for a pedestrian/bike path would relate to a decrease
in traffic. Id.at 395-96.
69The Court in Dolan began its analysis of how much of a relationship was required between
development impact and requested exaction by reviewing state court approaches to the issue. The Court
identified three general groups of states. First were those states taking a very deferential approach,
where even generalized statements regarding the required connection were sufficient. The Court
rejected this standard as too lax to provide sufficient protection for property rights. Second were those
states that applied a "very exacting" standard, which the Court rejected as too demanding. It then
aligned itself with what it called the intermediate and majority position. Id.at 389-91.
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regulatory practice of restrictions on the use of land. This was the focus of
the Lucas decision, in what might well be viewed as the most significant
takings case since Pennsylvania Coal. In Lucas the plaintiff purchased two
undeveloped beachfront lots for $975,000, both of which were zoned for
residential development at the time of purchase. Subsequently, a coastal
preservation law was passed that had the effect of prohibiting any
development on the property.70 Lucas challenged the restriction as a taking.
The state trial court found that the restriction rendered the property
"valueless," and therefore constituted a taking under Pennsylvania Coal.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, stating that however great the
economic impact might be, it7 2was not a taking because it was enacted "to
prevent serious public harm.
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that,
although most takings inquiries are generally fact specific and ad hoc in
nature, it had recognized two types of categorical takings in previous cases,
in which a taking is found once certain facts are established.73 The first
category is where the government "physically invades" or requires that
another be permitted to invade private property. In such situations a
compensable taking is nearly automatic, "no matter how small the
economic
impact and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind
74
it."

The second type of categorical taking recognized in Lucas occurs
"where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land. 75 In recognizing this type of categorical taking, the Court pointed
to a number of cases in which it had stated, albeit as dicta, that a taking
occurs when a regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land., 76 In justifying this categorical taking, the Court noted that "in the
extraordinary circumstance" when land has lost all economic viability, "it is
70

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.

71Id.at 1009.

72 Id. at 1010. The South Carolina Supreme Court relied upon what it perceived to be the
U.S. Supreme Court's "nuisance" line of cases, such as Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), which
arguably held that there is no talking when government regulates noxious activity, no matter how great
the economic loss to the landowner.
3ld.at 1015.
74id.
75id.
76

Id. at 1015-16. The Court had used the phrase "economically viable" in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), as part of a two-prong test for takings, stating that a land use law

will be taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land." The Court used that same articulation of the standard in a series of
decisions in the 1980's to begin discussion of takings. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-296 (1981). In none of the decisions was there a finding of "no

economic viability."

The first part of the test, stating that a taking exists if a regulation "does not

substantially advance legitimate state interests," was rejected by the Court in Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S.
Ct. 2074, 2087 (2004) as being inappropriate to a takings analysis.
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less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply
"adjusting the benefits and burdens of life. 77 The Court indicated,
however, that loss of economic viability would not constitute a taking
where the regulation is merely prohibiting a common law nuisance, since
such land use was not part of the landowner's property interest.78
In recognizing that the loss of economic viability constituted a
categorical taking, the Court was careful not to preclude the possibility of
finding a taking when a restriction reduces, but does not altogether
eliminate, economic viability. In a footnote, the Court noted that such a
restriction might still constitute a taking under the Court's ad hoc balancing
test in Penn Central.79 It did not clearly define how such a test might
operate, but stated that ."[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and . . . the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant" to its general takings
analysis. 80 Thus, the Court established what might be viewed as a two-fold
test for analyzing whether the economic impact of a regulation constitutes a
taking: first, there is a categorical taking if the regulation deprives the
owner of all economic viability, absent a finding that the prohibited use
would have constituted a common law nuisance; second, even if some
economic viability remains, a court is to examine the interference with
investment-backed standards under Penn Central.
'Insome respects Lucas was understandably hailed as a
significant
victory for property rights. Most importantly, it confirmed the earlier
premise of Pennsylvania Coal, that regulation alone might constitute a
taking, and it identified at least one instance in which that occurs without
balancing interests. Yet, as the Court itself recognized, deprivation of all
economic viability is a relatively rare occurrence, and the facts of Lucas are
rather unique.8 ' For that reason, Lucas was not the seismic shift seen by
some, but left the basic balance of private and community rights largely
unchanged.
The past several years have continued to see the Court's active
involvement in the takings area, with two cases of particular significance.
In the first case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court addressed several
issues, the most prominent being whether notice of a regulation when
property is acquired precludes a taking claim. 82 In that case, the claimant
7Lucas, 505

U.S. at 1017-18.
7' See Id. at 1029-31. The Court reasoned that, since under common law concepts of
property a landowner cannot cause a nuisance to his or her neighbor, the activity being regulated would
not "inhere in the title" to begin with.
'9id. at 1019 n. 8.
80Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124).
s'See id. at 1017-18.
82

533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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in question had acquired property subsequent to restrictions being placed on
the property to protect coastal wetlands.13
After having several
development proposals for the property denied because of the wetlands'
restrictions, the landowner sued on takings grounds. 4 The trial court held
there was no taking, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed,
holding, among other things, that any takings claim that might have existed
was precluded because Palazzolo had notice of the restrictions when he
acquired the property. 5
The Court began its analysis by affirming the two-part takings test
for regulatory takings earlier established in Lucas and Penn Central. Thus,
it stated that, subject to certain qualifications, a regulation that "denies an
owner all economically beneficial or productive use of land" will be a
categorical taking under Lucas.8 6 It affirmed, however, that a regulation
which falls short of eliminating all economic viability might still be a taking
under Penn Central, and thus must be separately analyzed under what it
labeled the "complex of factors" from that decision. 7 As stated by the
Court, these include "the regulation's economic effect on the landowner,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-88
backed expectations, and the character of the government action.,
Importantly, the Court stated that this analysis is to be "informed by the
purpose of the Takings Clause," which, reiterating a frequently emphasized
point, "is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. 89
The Court, after addressing the initial question of ripeness, 90 turned
its attention to the central issue in Palazzolo: whether notice of a regulation
83 The claimant, Palazzolo, had formed a small corporation in 1959 for the sole purpose of
acquiring the land in question. At that time the property was not subject to special coastal wetlands
restrictions. In 1977 the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council enacted special
regulations which prohibited any development without prior approval of the Council. In 1978 the state
revoked the corporation's corporate charter for failure to pay taxes. As a result, the property passed to
Palazzolo as the corporation's sole shareholder, who thereafter owned the property personally. The
Court treated Palazzolo as becoming owner in 1978, a year after the restrictions were in place. See id.at
613-14.
4 Id. at 613-15.
85See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 712-16 (R.I. 2000).
6 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615. The qualifications alluded to by the Court concerned the
observation in Lucas that a landowner cannot recover for a loss of all economic viability where the
restriction constitutes a "background principle" of law. See id. at 622-23 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
Id. at 617-18.
8
ld. at 617.
89Id. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Court
first stated this "fairness and justice" purpose for the takings clause in Armstrong, and has restated it in
numerous subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting
Armstrong); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting
Armstrong).
90See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618-25.
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when property is acquired precludes a takings claim.9' As noted above, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had held that Palazzolo's notice of the
restriction precluded a takings claim. 92 This in fact reflected a position
frequently taken by lower courts, which often rejected takings claims when
property owners were aware of restrictions at the time the property was
purchased. 93 Whether viewed as an issue of notice or of negation of
investment-backed expectations,94 the final result was the same in almost all
lower court decisions: If the challenged restriction existed when the
property was acquired, then the current owner could not succeed on a
takings claim.
The Supreme Court rejected this position in Palazzolo, stating that
post-regulation acquisition of property did not preclude challenging the
regulation as a taking. 95 In so holding, the Court emphasized two concerns:
First, restrictions that are unreasonable when imposed do not become less
so over time. Second, rejection of the notice rule was necessary to protect
owners at the time a restriction is imposed; otherwise, pre-regulation
owners would essentially lose the right to transfer their property. 9 Thus,
rejection of the notice rule was necessary not so much to protect the
interests of the current owners as to secure full protection for the rights of
the landowner when the restriction was imposed. The Court's holding,
however, was in part qualified by a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor
in which she said that, although notice should not preclude a takings claim,
notice of a restriction can play a role in assessing the degree of interference
with investment-backed expectations under Penn Central.97 The four
dissenting justices were each careful to agree with O'Connor on this
point,98 making a majority of five justices stating that notice can continue to
play a role in evaluating the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations.

9' See id. at 626-27.

92See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 712-16 (R.I. 2000).
93See, e.g., Avenel v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hoeck v. City of
Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 788-89 (9th Cit. 1995); Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Iowa 1994);
Wooten v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1999); see generally, R.S. Radford &
J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of
Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001).
94See, e.g., Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291 (N.H. 1984) ("A person who

purchases land with notice of statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if
any, legitimate investment-backed expectations of development rights which rise to the level of
constitutionally protected property rights").
9' See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627, 630.
96 See id. at 627.
9' See id. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98See id. at 634-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justices Souter and Breyer). See also id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with O'Connor on
the issue of notice).
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The Supreme Court's most recent land use takings decision is
99
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency.
As with Palazzolo, the case involved a rather focused issue: whether a
moratorium that prohibited development for up to thirty-two months
constituted a temporary taking.'0° The landowner argued that moratoria of
any significant length were categorical takings under the combined logic of
Lucas and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles.'' Lucas said that a loss of all economic viability constitutes a
categorical taking. 0 2 First English held that even temporary takings
required just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 0 3 Therefore, since
a moratorium prohibits all economic viability for a temporary period, it was
argued that it should be recognized as a temporary taking under the
combined logic of the two cases. °4
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a
moratorium that temporarily deprives an owner of economic use is not a
categorical taking. 0 5 It stated that the categorical rule announced in Lucas
was limited to the "'extraordinary case' in which a regulation deprives a
landowner "of all economically beneficial uses. ' °6 This can occur only
when a regulation is intended to be permanent when enacted because, in the
case of a temporary prohibition on economic use, the property recovers
value when the prohibition is lifted. To hold otherwise would permit
landowners to conceptually sever a thirty-two month segment from the fee
simple estate and then anal ze "whether the segment had been taken in its
entirety by the moratoria.' ' 7
The Court proceeded to note that such attempts at conceptual
severance were precluded by Penn Central,which stated that, in analyzing
takings, the parcel must be considered as a whole.' ° According to the
majority in Tahoe, this includes not only the full geographic dimensions of
the property, but also the temporal dimensions of the property.'0 9 Thus, a

99535 U.S. 302 (2002).
0

' o See id. at 306.

'o' See Tahoe, 122 S.Ct. at 1477-78.
02
1 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
103482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
'04 Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 329-31.
105See id.
0

' 6 Id. at

330.

107Id. at 331.

log Id.
109The Court stated that land is defined by both "geographic" and "temporal" dimensions,
and that both "must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its entirety." The Court stated that
only a permanent deprivation of the entire geographic area can constitute a categorical taking. A

temporary taking of the entire geographic area cannot be a categorical taking, since the property
recovers its value when the restriction is removed. Thus, there is not a loss of all economic viability.
See id. at 331-32.
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permanent deprivation of economic use on all of a parcel is a categorical
taking, while a temporary deprivation is not." 0
Although the Court held that moratoria would therefore not
constitute categorical takings,"' it did not go so far as to declare moratoria
never vulnerable to a takings challenge. Instead, it held that the Penn
Central test was the appropriate standard for determining when a
moratorium might constitute a taking." 2 This is necessarily an ad hoc and
very particularized analysis, requiring a "weighing of all relevant
circumstances.""13 Importantly, as in Palazzolo, the Court emphasized that
the analysis
was to be guided by the fundamental principal of "fairness and
'' 4
justice. 1
Read together, these five recent decisions recognize three types of
takings scenarios and establish what might be loosely labeled as strict,
intermediate, and deferential standards of review to address them. In
dictum, the Court continued to give the highest protection possible to
physical invasions, suggesting a near per se rule that makes even the most
minimal permanent invasion a taking.' ' Dolan established intermediate
scrutiny in the form of the "rough proportionality" standard that applies to
the use of development exactions." 6 Finally, Lucas, Palazzolo, and Tahoe
confirm that run of the mill land use restrictions are subject to a two-step
"economic impact" analysis, which first examines whether there is a loss of
all economic viability, and, if economic viability remains, analyzes the
restriction under the Penn Central factors. 17 Although landowners
prevailed in two of these decisions, the victories were of quite limited
reach. The Court in Lucas acknowledged it was addressing a very rare
scenario, and the victory in Palazzolo was on the isolated issue of notice
and-was substantially undermined by O'Connor's concurring opinion. As
we shall see, the basic two-step test outlined in those cases has turned out to
be very deferential.

"id.
1 After rejecting the principal argument that the combination of First English and Lucas
made the moritorium a categorical taking, the Court also briefly considered seven other theories that
might require a conclusion that on its face the moratorium in question constituted a taking. The Court
concluded that none of these theories would support finding the moratorium a categorical taking. See
Id. at 33-42. The Court summarized by stating that the "interest in 'fairness and justice' will be best
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than
attempting to craft a new categorical rule." Id.at 342.
112 id.

113id.
114Id. at

334-36, 342.
..See Tahoe, 535 U.S at 321-22; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
"6 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
. See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 342; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615, 617-18; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019
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These three standards, which will be examined more closely in the
next section, reflect different levels of accommodation between private and
public interests in land. In striking this balance, however, the Court
consistently stated that the principal purpose of the takings clause is "to bar
the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
118 This language was first used in 1960 in Armstrong v. United States, and
has since been consistently repeated by the Court as the primary policy
concern underlying its takings jurisprudence.1 9 The Court's recent
decisions in Palazzolo and Tahoe have particularly emphasized "fairness
and justice" as the central concern of takings jurisprudence. 20 The three
distinct levels of takings review might therefore be fairly understood as the
Court's respective accommodation of interests in determining when
property owners themselves should bear the burden of regulation and when
the public should bear the burden through payment of just compensation.
The next three sections of the article will examine more thoroughly
the three types of takings and the three levels of review. These sections
will examine both the application of each standard and the rationales for the
balance between private and public interests struck by the Court. Although
takings jurisprudence remains far from clear, this article will suggest that,
for the most part, the balance is a sensible one.
III. PHYSICAL INVASIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY
Perhaps the most certain aspect of takings jurisprudence is the
Supreme Court's consistent treatment of permanent physical invasions of
private property as per se takings, no matter how minimal the economic
impact. As noted above, Lucas, in dictum, recognized this as one of two
types of categorical takings, in which no balancing of respective interests
was required;' 2' rather, once an invasion or occupation is shown, a taking is
established. The near-automatic nature of this type of taking was similarly
recognized in Nollan and in Dolan, decisions that
were both predicated, in
22
part, on the Court's physical invasion standard.
The Court's close scrutiny of physical invasions as takings predates
even Pennsylvania Coal, finding its origins in several decisions rendered
more than a century ago. For example, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,123
18

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); (quoting Armstrong); Penn
Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting Armstrong).
20
' See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 323-33, 342; Palazolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
"9

12'

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.

'2See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 ("had
California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the
public on a permanent basis.., we would have no doubt there would have been a taking.").
" 13 Wall 166,20 L.Ed. 557 (1872).
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the Court held that permanent flooding of private property as a consequence
of a state authorized dam constituted a taking. The Court stated that "where
real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth,
sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so
as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the
meaning of the Constitution."'1 4 In several subsequent decisions the Court
affirmed that permanent invasions by flooding constitute a taking,
distinguishing it from merely temporary interferences. 125 The Court
likewise suggested in other early cases that similar types of permanent
physical invasions, even when involving only 26
small areas, such as with
telephone or telegraph lines, constituted takings.
More recent years have seen the physical invasion principle applied
to other types of government activities. For example, in United States v.
Causby,'2 the Court held that frequent flights by military aircraft a short
distance above the ground constituted a taking. 28 Similarly, in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States129 the Court held that recognition of a navigational
servitude that consequentially required public access to a private marina
was a taking. 30 In finding a taking, the Court emphasized that the
mandated servitude deprived the landowner of the right to exclude, which it
labeled as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property."13'
What is probably the Court's most significant physical invasion
in 1981 in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,132
came
case
where it held that a New York law that required landlords to provide cable
access to tenants constituted a taking. In finding the law unconstitutional,
the Court noted that the law's effect was to give cable companies the right
to run cables on private property and thereby physically occupy a portion of
24

1

d.at 181.

125See

United States v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 445, 468-70 (1903) (flooding of land caused by
government built dams and training walls constituted permanent physical invasion and taking); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (government lock and dam subjected land to frequent flooding
constituted permanent invasion so as to be a taking). In contrast, the Court held that there was not a
taking where government action caused a temporary flooding with some resulting damage, instead of
"an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of the land, and not merely an
injury to, the property." Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); see also Bedford v.
United States,
2 6 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904).
1 See St. Louis v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); See also, W. Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 590 (1904).
127328 U.S. 256 (1946).

2
'1
Id.at 261.
'2'
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
0
13 Id. at 180 ("the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an
actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina . . . And even if the Government physically
invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation.").
,Id. at 176.

132 458 U.S. 419 (1981).
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the property.133 Although the Court acknowledged that the degree of
invasion was in fact quite small and only caused minimal economic
impact, 34 it nevertheless stressed that any physical invasion constitutes a
taking under the Court's precedent. Moreover, the minimal economic
impact was not a consideration, since physical invasion takings were not
predicated on economic concerns.
In reaffirming the bright line physical invasion standard, the Court
stressed not only its longstanding concerns about such actions,' 35 but also
what it perceived as the critical role that the right to exclude played in
property ownership. Emphasizing that the right to exclude is at the core of
property ownership, the Court noted that the owner of land "suffers a
special kind of injury
when a stranger directly invades and occupies the
' 36
owner's property."'
As noted above, the near per se rule regarding physical invasions
seen in Loretto and its progeny has been reiterated in dicta in a number of
the recent takings cases.' 37 As it currently stands, the rule might be fairly
characterized as a form of strict scrutiny because of the near absolute nature
of the prohibition against physical invasions.' 38 Although the test itself
does not involve a closely scrutinized means/ends formula, such as is found
in equal protection review, it nevertheless essentially prohibits any form of
permanent, physical invasion of property. This is true no matter how small
the actual invasion, or how minimal the economic impact on the
landowner's interest.1 39 Thus, in the same way that equal protection
analysis closely guards against race-based classifications, so too does the
physical invasion standard closely guard against even the most minimal
occupations of land.
. The physical invasion test therefore strikes the balance between
private and public interests heavily in favor of private rights when the right
to exclude is at stake. In so doing, the Court has consistently emphasized
that the right to exclude others is at the core of what we understand as
property rights. 140 In this sense it is qualitatively different than mere use
133
See id. at 438.
14 See id. at 434-35 (where a permanent physical invasion occurs there is a taking "without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact

on the owner.").
' See id. at 426-35 (reviewing Court's treatment of permanent physical invasions).
at 436 (emphasis original).
137 See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 322; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan,
136 Id.

483 U.S. at 1015.
131
See, e.g., Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 322 ("involves the straightforward application of per se
rules"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (physical invasion constitutes a categorical taking).
"9See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 322 (physical invasion is a taking "no matter how small");

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at ("even a minimal 'permanent physical occupation' ... requires compensation");
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (physical invasion is a taking "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no

matter how weighty the public interest behind it").

14 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (right to exclude others is

"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as roperty");
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rights and deserving of almost absolute protection. As such, even the most
minimal intrusions are problematic
41 and the economic impact is altogether
1
analysis.
Court's
the
to
irrelevant
The near sacred status the Court has given to the right to exclude,
as reflected in the physical invasion test, has not been without critics,
especially when compared to the more deferential standard with regard to
use restrictions. 42 As stated in the dissent in Loretto, for many property
owners, especially those with nonresidential land, the economic use of
property is its primary purpose and is more important than the right to
exclude. 143 This is particularly true when comparing minimal physical
invasions with substantial economic loss. Critics have noted that, to many
landowners, severe use restrictions are more problematic and constitute a
greater interference with expectations than minor physical invasions, and
therefore to give almost complete protection to one and only
144 limited
protection to the other does not coincide with landowner interests.
Although it is undoubtedly true that, for many property owners,
physical invasions are less of a concern than significant use restrictions, the
bright-line physical invasion test can be justified for several reasons. As
noted by the Court in Loretto, the bright-line physical invasion test avoids
the inevitable line drawing problems that would otherwise occur.14 5 More
fundamentally, however, the bright-line rule, which precludes balancing of
the particular interests involved, simply reflects that the Supreme Court
itself has already done the balancing in advance and concluded that the
right to exclude others is so fundamental to our concept of property that
trade-offs should not occur. This does not preclude government from
physically invading or appropriating property but simply requires that
government pay just compensation if it does so.
Seen in this way, the Court's near absolute physical invasion test is
understood as recognition of the particularly significant role that the right to
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (quoting KaiserAetna); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. For
a general discussion of the Supreme Court emphasis on the right to exclude, see David L. Callies & J.
David Bremer, The Right to Exclude Othersfrom PrivateProperty:A FundamentalConsitutionalRight.
3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 39 (2000).
141The Court has not considered the severity of economic impact in deciding physical
invasion cases, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1981), and has
emphasized that even minimal invasions are unconstitutional, see, e.g., Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 323 (physical
invasion is a taking "no matter how small"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (physical invasion a taking "no
matter how minute the intrusion").
142See John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the
Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1985); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.L. REv. 1165, 1185-87
(1967).
I4 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14 See id. See also Costonis, supra note 142 at 507-08 (stating that Loretto's "greatest
defeat" was its "failure to acknowledge that fairness is the takings clause's dominant goal").
'41 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at
436-37.
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exclude plays in property ownership. That in turn can be justified on
several grounds. First, as noted by the Court in Loretto, the right to exclude
cuts across each of the three traditional aspects of property ownership:
possession, use, and disposal. 46 When property is occupied by the
government or by a third party, not only does this occupation interfere with
the owner's right to possession, but it also greatly interferes with or negates
the use and disposal of that portion of occupied land. Thus, as noted by the
Court, physical invasions do not just take a strand from the bundle of
property147rights, but in fact cut through each of the strands that are in the
bundle.
Second, as a general matter, the right to exclude is essential to
productive use of land in our system. 148 The ability to exclude others from
property is an important incentive to the investment of resources. If others
cannot be excluded from property, there are few incentives to invest in
property improvements, since any improved value is shared by and
potentially dissipated by others. 149 To take an extreme example, there is
little incentive to improve property by building a home if others cannot be
excluded from the premises. By ensuring that the full benefits of land
investments and improvements are reserved to the owner, the right to
exclude provides incentives for land development, which is essential to
economic growth and personal well-being.
On a larger scale, the right to exclude is a central component to
ensuring that incentives exist to provide for a number of critical societal
goods. By ensuring that one "reaps what one sows," the right to exclude
provides incentives for the provision of critical resources, such as housing,
for our society. Minimal physical invasions do not necessarily threaten
such incentives, but the right to exclude as a general matter is so critical to
our economic and property system that it should be guarded from even
minimal intrusions.
Third, and perhaps most important, the right to exclude is necessary
for personal autonomy and privacy, which serves an important mediating
function in society. The Supreme Court strongly voiced this position as it
relates to the home in Carey v. Brown, 50 when it said:
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to
which men and women can repair to escape from the
'4

See 458 U.S. at 435-36.

141See id. at 435.

148See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson PrivateProperty,PublicRights and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 267-68 (1996).
4 See id. at 268 (without "reasonably secure expectations of continued ownership" there
would be little reason to improve resources and property); John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land
Ethic, 74 MNN. L. REv. 339, 347 (1989) ("[p]eople more likely will sow when they are assured that
they will reap and enjoy the fruits of their labors").
,, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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tribulation of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solitude for the right
of an individual 'to be let alone' in the privacy of the home,
'sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick' ....

The State's interest in protecting the well-being,

tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society.'5 1
Beyond economic use, property serves to preserve autonomy and
privacy and to ensure a space secure from both government and the public.
It is this mediating function, in which property serves to buffer the
individual from society and the state, that perhaps most strongly justifies
the bright-line physical invasion standard. In balancing the relative private
and public interests involved, the
private interest in maintaining privacy and
152
autonomy is made paramount.
It is true that many of the types of physical invasions struck down
by the Supreme Court do not realistically threaten autonomy and privacy
concerns or, for that matter, future investment in property. Yet the Court
seems to recognize that the right to exclude, more than any other
characteristic of property ownership, distinguishes our system of private
property.. And, as noted, that core understanding of property ownership is
essential to productive use of property for society's benefit and to
individual autonomy. Thus, the Court appears unwilling to permit the
slightest permanent interference with the right to exclude, not because of
the harms. posed in specific cases themselves, but because of where the
slippery slope might lead.
The near absolute manner in which the physical invasion test is
applied suggests a standard analogous to strict scrutiny. In at least one
important way, however, the physical invasion test differs from strict
scrutiny.
One reason the Court applies strict scrutiny to racial
classifications, for example, is that race is rarely a relevant basis for
classifying people. Hence, the Court is suspicious of any use of race. As
the Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger'53 demonstrates,
however, the Court will examine to see if there is a compelling government
interest that supports the classification, and, if narrowly drawn, will permit
5
1152
1Id. at 471 (citations omitted).
This, of course, does not mean that government

cannot have temporary and limited access

to property for investigation purposes, nor does it mean that property owners have a right to do whatever
they want in the privacy of their home. The law permits reasonable searches of property, including
homes, and can criminalize activity, such as drug use in the privacy of the home. What the balance
means, however, is that the state cannot claim a possessory interest in private property, for the public
welfare, absent compensation. In this sense the law clearly makes private property interests paramount
over broaderpublic concerns.

" 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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racial classifications. 154 Thus, although it is an uphill battle, strict scrutiny
under equal protection does examine the strength of the state's interest and,
in rare instances, will find it justifies the classification.
With regard to permanent physical invasions, however, the Court
gives little or no regard to the strength of the government's interest. For
example, in Lucas the Court stated that compensation is required for any
physical invasion "no matter how minute the intrusion and no matter how
155 This disregard for the importance
weighty the public purpose behind it."
of the state interest when physical invasions are involved can be explained,
in part, by the option of compensation to secure the interest where
necessary. Thus, the state is never deprived of the opportunity to pursue
weighty interests that might interfere with a landowner's right to exclude.
It just has to pay for it. Seen in that light, the per se rule against
uncompensated physical invasion, while drawing the balance heavily in
favor of the individual and against the state, still leaves ample room for the
state to pursue important interests.
Defining the public/private balance this way makes sense both
conceptually and pragmatically. How landowners use their property
frequently imposes broader costs on society, and society can therefore
legitimately assert some communal interest in land use so as to avoid or at
least minimize those costs. In contrast, the right to exclude others from
land is less likely to have broader societal implications. In such an instance
it is typically hard to conceptualize the right to exclude as infringing on
public rights and interests. Instead, it appears that the public is trying to
obtain additional rights. Thus, the broader public interest, which can be
considerable with regard to how land is used, is more minimal in terms of
public access to land.
From a pragmatic perspective, drawing such a one-sided balance
between private and public interests when there is a permanent physical
invasion poses few problems. As noted, the public can always obtain the
right to invade by paying compensation. Generally speaking, the public
will infrequently need to assert an invasive interest in land, far less
frequently than with regard to use restrictions. Moreover, the actual just
compensation will be minimal, since often only relatively minor parts of
property will be affected. Thus, there is little reason to believe that the
Court's rigid physical invasion test will preclude the federal and state
governments from pursuing important interests.

154See

id. at 336-39.

"' Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY," AND
INTERMEDIATE REVIEW

The second type of taking scenario identified by the Court is
development approval made contingent upon providing development
exactions in the form of a physical dedication of land. This type of taking
was first recognized in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,156 where
the Court required an essential nexus between the required development
exactions and the development impacts, meaning that there had to be at
least some minimal relationship between the two. 1' 7 The Court later
clarified the required degree of relationship in Dolan v. City of Tigard,'
stating that there must be "rough proportionality" between the exaction and
the impacts. It noted this did not require "mathematical precision," but it
did necessitate some effort to quantify the relationship.' 59
In recognizing and establishing a standard for this second type of
taking, the Court in both Nollan and Dolan predicated its analysis upon the
physical invasion standard discussed above. In both decisions the Court
noted that, if the government had simply demanded the physical dedications
in question instead of making them a condition of development approval,
they would clearly constitute a taking. 160 It noted, however, that, if
legitimate reasons existed to deny the development because of its impact,
then approval of the development may be made contingent on exactions
designed to alleviate the impact. This provides landowners with expanded
options beyond an outright denial and is thus justified so long
as the
6
exactions relate to the concerns associated with the development.' '
In a sense, therefore, the Nollan-and-Dolan test for development
exactions is a derivative of the physical invasion test; it essentially
recognizes a limited circumstance in which the government might
appropriate a physical use without paying compensation.
Yet the
development exaction scenario and the accompanying Dolan test are best
considered a distinct type of taking for several reasons. First, development
exactions are a unique regulatory device very distinct from the type of
government actions that constitute physical invasions. In recent years
exactions have become an intricate part of the land development process
and are increasingly used for a variety of purposes. 162 Although not
s6483 U.S. 825 (1987).

157Id. at 837.

' 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
159Id. at 391.
160
161
162

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384;Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
See generally, ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ,

REVENUE 19-20, 35-39 (1994); JULIAN CONRAD

REGULATION FOR

JUERENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 274-281 (2003); Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier,
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technically a land use regulation, they might be fairly understood as part of
the regulatory land use system as it exists today. Indeed, they have become
a central feature of the modem land development process and are
commonly seen as serving various regulatory purposes. 163 Thus, exactions
have a distinct regulatory flavor that, together with their ubiquitous use and
the unique concerns they present, suggest they be understood as a distinct
type of taking.
Recognition of development exactions as a distinct taking concern
is further reflected in the "rough proportionality" standard itself, which is
distinct from the more rigid physical invasion standard. Whereas outright
physical invasions trigger a bright-line standard that is near fatal in its
execution,' 64 the "rough proportionality" standard involves a more factsensitive inquiry into the relationship between the exaction and the
developmental harm. It asks an entirely different question than is involved
in direct physical invasions and invokes a unique and more thoughtful
analysis. Moreover, unlike the per se rule for physical invasions, the
"rough proportionality" test for exactions anticipates the propriety and even
the desirability of 65development exactions, but requires that they be done for
the right reasons.

In this sense, "rough proportionality" can be fairly understood as a
type of intermediate scrutiny, falling between the strict physical invasion
standard and the more deferential "economic impact" analysis. On one
hand, by requiring "proportionality" between the regulatory burden (the
exaction) and the perceived harm to which it is addressed (development
impacts,) the Court is clearly requiring a level of scrutiny beyond that
which is normally given to economic and social legislation, where there
typically only needs to be some minimal relationship.66 This is reinforced67
by the requirement that the relationship be quantified in some manner.1

Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 51, 62 (Winter 1987).
163See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 482-83 (1991) (stating that in addition
to shifting infrastructure costs to developers, exactions also serve to "induce a more efficient use of
infrastructure," help mitigate the negative effects of development on neighboring areas, help to
internalize development harms, enables growth in areas where government cannot provide public
facilities fast enough or where a development proposal is controversial, and allow communities to
recapture from developers "value added to land" by community financed improvements).
'"See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1981); see also,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (physical invasions constitute categorical
takings).
165 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
'6 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) ("law must be reasonable,
not arbitrary" and have "a rational relationship to a permissible state objective"); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (law must simply be a "rational way to correct" perceived
problem).
167See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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168
Quantification is not required in more deferential levels of review.
Together, the requirements of proportionality and quantification call for
scrutiny of the relationship substantially greater than that normally
demanded of regulatory practices.
On the other hand, the burden falls far short of that normally
associated with strict scrutiny. The term "rough" itself suggests a
somewhat loose standard, as the Court indicated that, although the
relationship had to be quantified in some manner, mathematical precision
was not required. 169 This suggests the need for only a reasonable
approximation of relationship between exaction and impact. Moreover,
unlike the physical invasion scenario, the test is not intended to operate as a
near per se rejection of government actions, but instead anticipates the
propriety of many exactions.
This characterization of the level of review as intermediate is
further supported by the Court's own discussion, in which it characterized
"rough proportionality" as corresponding to an intermediate position taken
by states. In Dolan, the Court, before articulating its own standard,
examined state court approaches to reviewing exactions, placing them in
three categories: exacting, deferential, and intermediate. 170 It specifically
rejected those decisions taking what it characterized as a "lax" standard on
one hand and as an "exacting" standard on the other, instead aligning itself
with what it labeled the "intermediate position."''
"Rough proportionality" therefore is designed to police, but not to
discourage, the use of development exactions.
While affirming the
propriety and even the necessity of exactions, the Court stated that
exactions must relate to and must flow from the development in question.
This requirement guards against use of the development process as a means
to extort property interests that would normally require payment of just
compensation. As a practical matter, the "rough proportionality" standard
of review should not impose substantial costs on local governments.
As such, "rough proportionality" seeks to balance two competing
concerns. On one hand, the Court was clearly cognizant of the need to use
exactions as a reasonable device to offset the impacts of development. This
is particularly true when compared to the alternative of prohibiting the
proposed development altogether, which would often be justified by the
negative external impacts created by the development. Thus, exactions are
168See, e.g., Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Comnc'ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (stating that
under rational basis review "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfimding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data); see generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 23 at 601-04, 651-59.
'69 See Dolan,512 U.S. at 391.
"o Id. at 389-9 1.
1'

Id. at 390.
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a perfectly legitimate way to address the secondary impacts often created
by development, and the Court was careful to affirm their validity and
necessity as a land use device.
On the other hand, the Court was also cognizant of the potential
abuse of the exaction process. In particular, the Court was aware of how it
might easily be used to "extort" concessions from landowners completely
unrelated to the impact of development. 72 In this sense, the standard is
predicated upon the fairness concerns often noted by the Court as
underlying any takings analysis.173 Where new development results in
impacts upon the community, which is often the case, landowners can
reasonably be expected to pay, through exactions, for measures designed to
offset those impacts. However, fairness prohibits making landowners pay
for problems unrelated to their development. Such demands amount to
extortion and violate fundamental understandings of fair play.
The "rough proportionality" standard thus represents an
intermediate accommodation of communal and private interests in land.
The standard strongly affirms that local governments have a legitimate
interest in addressing and, if necessary, prohibiting the impacts of
development. In this sense, it is a strong affirmation of the government's
ability to regulate property for the common good and stands for the
proposition that individual interests in land are limited by the broader
impact they might have. However, the test limits the public interest to the
external impacts of proposed development.
Perhaps more importantly, the intermediate standard of review
represented by the "rough proportionality" test is arguably a reasonable
response to the threat posed to private interests. Although the test is in part
predicated upon physical invasion concerns, the typical exaction scenario
does not pose the qualitative concerns presented by direct physical
invasions. Landowners are not being directly denied the right to exclude
others, but they are provided an alternative to denial of a proposed
development. More importantly, to the extent physical appropriation might
result (as with land dedicated for a school or a park,) it relates to and flows
from the impact the landowner's development will have on the broader
community. Thus, the rationales supporting the stricter physical invasion
standard do not apply.
However, the potential for abuse is much more substantial with
exactions than in the typical regulatory setting. Unlike typical zoning
controls, which are broad-based legislative enactments, exactions are
imposed in an adjucatory setting. The fairness concerns that exist here are
172See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
173See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); Dolan, 512 U.S. at
384; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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not based upon regulatory impact, though that is relevant, so much as upon
regulatory method. The fear that the government would use the permit
approval process as a pretext for obtaining more than the situation warrants
justifies the greater scrutiny.
V. LAND USE RESTRICTIONS, ECONOMIC IMPACT,
AND DEFERENTIAL REVIEW

A. The DeferentialReview of Government Land Use Regulations

The third and most significant type of taking is that which is based
on the economic impact of a land use regulation. Unlike the physical
invasion and exaction takings, which are limited to more unique scenarios,
takings based on economic impact are potentially applicable to any land use
restriction. For this reason, economic impact analysis is properly viewed as
the heart of the takings issue and helps shape the core of what might be
viewed as constitutionally recognized property rights.
As discussed in part II, the Court's current approach to takings
based on economic impact emanates from two cases, Penn Central

Transportation Co. v. New York City' 74 and Lucas v. South Carolina

75
Coastal Council.1
Taken together, those two cases established what might
be viewed as a two-fold test for analyzing whether the economic impact of
a regulation constitutes a taking. First, if the regulation leaves the owner
with no economic viability, it is a categorical taking, 7 6 unless the
regulation is prohibiting a common law nuisance. 177 Second, even if some
economic viability remains, a court is to determine if a taking exists under
Penn Central by examining the character of the government action, the
economic impact of the regulation, and the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations. 7 8
The Court's recent decisions in

Palazzolo v. Rhode Islandand Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency clearly affirmed this dual Lucas/Penn Central

analysis as the proper standard for79 determining when a regulation's
economic impact constitutes a taking.1
The emergence of this two-part economic impact analysis, and in
particular the recognition of loss of economic viability as a categorical
taking, has been perceived by some as an expansion of private property
114438

U.S. 104 (1977).
"'
76 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
1 1d. at 1015.
" Id. at 1029-31.
8
"a
1d. at 1019 n. 8.
"79See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 330, 342; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
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rights at the expense of the government's ability to control land uses.' °
Lucas itself was hailed as a significant victory for property rights
proponents and a signal that the Court would give heightened scrutiny to
land use regulations.' 8 ' Moreover, the Court's clear statement in Palazzolo
and Tahoe that, even when economic viability remains, there still might be
a taking under Penn Central, might be viewed as further scrutiny of
government efforts to regulate land.
Of particular concern has been the impact on the government's
efforts to protect environmentally sensitive land. These properties, such as
coastal zones, wetlands, habitat for endangered species, farmland, and open
space, provide special environmental amenities to society that justify their
protection. By their very nature, however, these properties must be kept in
their natural state to protect their use as an environmental resource. This
potentially poses a problem under the Lucas "loss of economic viability"
standard since such regulations often preclude development.
Despite these concerns and the perceptions of heightened scrutiny
associated with Lucas, as a practical matter the Court's "economic impact"
takings analysis for typical land use restrictions is quite deferential to
government regulatory objectives. Although recognizing that government
regulation of property might constitute a taking in extreme situations, the
standard provides the state with significant ability to regulate private
property for the public good. This is true even where the restriction results
in a substantial diminution of property value, as long as some economic
viability remains.
Thus, most common zoning restrictions, though
foreclosing a number of development options with some resulting economic
loss, nevertheless leave some development opportunities. Even regulations

180See, e.g., Dana Beach & Kim Diana Connolly, A Retrospective on Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: Public PolicyImplicationsfor the 21" Century, 12 SE. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2003)
(noting worry of environmental advocates after Lucas); Michael C. Blumm, PropertyMyths, Judicial
Activism, andthe Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL.L. 907, 914 (1993) (stating that Lucas "might help to establish
the Constitution as an unfortunate restraint on the ability of environmental and land use regulation to
control the adverse effects of development); Jan Goldman-Carter, ProtectingWetlands andReasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations in Wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 28 LAND &

WATER L. REv, 425, 430 (1993) ("the decision will surely influence future governmental efforts to
maintain and restore wetlands"); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholdsof Nuisance and the Takings

Clause, 18 COLUM. J.ENVTL. L. 1,3 (1993) ("one possible effect of Lucas may be to stunt, if not arrest,
the evolution of statutory protections from nuisance-like and other detrimental uses of land"); Paul
Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on Takings
Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 555 (1993) ("Lucas sharply restricts the ability of government, and
particularly and legislative branch, to protect the nation's wetlands resources through the use of police
power regulations").
181See Beach & Connolly, supra note 180 at 6 (noting that property rights proponents saw
Lucas as signaling new era); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the UnitedStates Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM

ENVTL. L.J. 523, 533-34 (1995) (language of recent Supreme Court takings decisions "has given
attorneys, academic analysts, and the public at large the impression that the Court is increasingly
sympathetic" to property rights).
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to protect environmentally sensitive land should, in most instances, fare
well under the test.
For this reason, the two-part economic impact test from Lucas and
Penn Central might be properly viewed as a highly deferential form of
review. The form of the test does not necessarily resemble deferential
review in other contexts since it closely examines the supporting facts and,
under the Penn Centralcomponent, balances various factors. This is a level
of inquiry that does not normally accompany deferential review.1 82 In
terms of the relationship it establishes between the government and
individuals, however, it is highly deferential to the government, permitting
substantial regulation of private land and rarely finds a taking. This is in
contrast to the physical invasion scenario, where the balance weighs heavily
on the side of the landowner, and the exaction scenario, where the balance
is relatively even. True, the Lucas/Penn Central test might be viewed as
deferential review with some bite, since it occasionally does result in a
court finding a taking, but in the big picture the balance weighs
substantially on the side of government in its efforts to regulate private
property for the public good.
The next two subsections will examine more closely the deferential
nature of the test, first discussing the Lucas "loss of economic viability"
prong and then discussing the three-part Penn Centraltest. This article will
then examine the policy rationales supporting deferential review for this
third type of taking challenge.
1. Loss of Economic Viability
The Court has clearly indicated that the first part of the Lucas/Penn
Central test, which recognizes a categorical taking when a regulation
results in a loss of all economic viability, will occur only in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. Lucas itself characterized loss of economic
viability as an "extraordinary circumstance" that would typically occur only
when land is "left substantially in its natural state."'' 83 The Court's sole
focus in its discussion in Lucas was the absence of any beneficial,
economic, or productive uses.' 4 There was no suggestion in Lucas that
severe economic impact itself could create a categorical taking. Indeed, the
18 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23 at 657 ("The Court has declared that under national

basis review the actual purpose behind a low is irrelevant and the law must be upheld 'if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' its discrimination.").
183Lucas 505 U.S. at 1018.
'"

See id. at 1017 ("[s]urely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive

or economically beneficial use of land is permitted . . .")(emphasis original); id. at 1019 ("there are

good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses...") (emphasis original).
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Court indicated in a footnote that even a 95% loss in property value would
not constitute a denial of all economic or productive use, though noting it
still might be a taking under Penn Central.185 Thus, the tone of Lucas
demonstrates that categorical takings are based on a complete absence of
remaining productive uses, which will only occur in highly unusual
circumstances.
Both Palazzolo and Tahoe affirm that categorical takings based on
loss of economic viability are extremely rare. In Palazzolo, the regulated
landowner tried to make the case for a "total taking" by comparing the
profit potential for the property, $3,150,000, with the minimum residual
value after regulation, $200,000. He argued in that context that the state
"cannot sidestep" Lucas by "the simple expedient of leaving a few crumbs
of value. 186 The Court rejected the comparison, however, focusing on
what remained rather than what was taken. It acknowledged that the state
cannot escape a categorical taking under Lucas by leaving just a "token
interest" in the property but said that "a regulation permitting a landowner
to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the
property 'economically idle."",187
Although this treatment of the
"economically viable" standard is cursory, it affirms the standard's narrow
reach.
The Court in Tahoe again took occasion to emphasize the need for
a complete loss of all economic use before a categorical taking could be
found. In discussing the reach of a categorical taking under Lucas, it noted
that the statute in that case had "'wholly eliminated the value"' of the
property. 188 The Court stressed that Lucas required there be no productive
189
use of the property and that there be a "complete elimination of value."'
Taken together, these cases indicate that even a severe economic
impact will not constitute a categorical taking if some minimal economic
use remains. Rather, the Lucas standard clearly requires a complete loss of
value and economic use. As noted by the Court in Lucas, this might only
occur when the property is required to be left in its natural state. 190 Few
land use controls involve this degree of regulation; they limit rather than
eliminate development opportunities. The one exception, of course, is land
185

In this footnote the Court responded to an argument in Justice Stevens' dissenting

opinion, in which he had criticized the majority rule as "wholly arbitrary" because a "landowner whose
property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing," "'while the landowner who suffers a complete
elimination of value recovers the land's full value."' Id. at 1019 n. 8 (quoting dissent of Justice Stevens,
id.at 1064). The majority appeared to agree that a 95% diminution in value would not constitute a
categorical taking, but was quick to note that a taking might still be found under Penn Central. It
further noted, however, that at least in some cases even a 95% diminution in value is not a taking. Id. at
1019 n. 8.
,86See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31.
"' Id. at 631.
181 Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 330.
89See id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, 20).
90o
SeeLucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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use control designed to protect environmentally sensitive lands, such as
farmland, wetlands, coastal zones, habitat for endangered species, and the
like. By their nature, such restrictions often must prohibit development on
that land subject to regulation in order to meet the environmental
objectives.
Even here, however, the Court has indicated there will not be a
categorical taking if the restriction is on less than all of the property. The
Court has held that, for purposes of analyzing economic impact, courts are
to evaluate a regulation's impact on the entirety of a claimant's property
and not just on the restricted portion of the property.1 9 1 Although Lucas
itself raised a question in a footnote on how the property should be defined
in such situations, 92 in other cases the Court has clearly indicated that, for
purposes of evaluating the economic impact of a regulation on property,
courts should consider the economic impact on the entire contiguous parcel,
and not just on the restricted portion.
The Court first held that property must be viewed as a whole in
Penn Central, where the property owner argued that the relevant unit of
property for analyzing economic impact was only the restricted air rights,
which would indicate a significant economic impact. The Court rejected
the argument, however, instead treating the relevant unit of property as the
air rights together with the underlying currently developed parcel. The
Court stated that
Takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
191The question of how to define the property for takings analysis is often referred to as the

denominator or the conceptual severance issue. See, e.g., ROBERT ELICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS 215-216 (2001 2nd ed.); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988). A number of
commentators have noted its importance in assessing economic impact. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald,
Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings
Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 126-27 (1995); Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?
Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25
ENVTL. L. 171, 184 (1995); Carol Rose, Mahon Reonstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still A Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 566-69 (1984); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967).
192 The Court stated:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically viable
use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the
"property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its
natural state, is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which
the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution
in value of the tract as a whole.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7.
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deciding whether a particular government action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather on the character
of the action and on the nature and extent
93 of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
The court reaffirmed this analysis in several subsequent decisions,
including Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,194 where
it again emphasized that property is not to be segmented but instead treated
as a whole. It stated that any other approach would permit landowners to
argue that virtually any restriction on property, including 195
such basic
limitations as zoning setback requirements, constitutes a taking.
The Court again affirmed a "property as the whole" analysis in
Tahoe, albeit in a slightly different context. There the affected landowners
had argued that a thirty-two month moratorium on development constituted
a categorical taking under the combined logic of First English and Lucas,
stating that it constituted a complete loss of economic viability.' 96 In
rejecting this argument, the Court again emphasized that takings
jurisprudence does not divide property into discrete segments but views the
property as a whole. 197 The Court stated that this included both the spatial
and temporal dimensions of the property. 198 Thus, just as the restricted
portion of property is not to be severed for analysis, so too a thirty-two
month period is not to be severed and treated as a loss of all economic
viability. 199
These cases demonstrate the Court's adoption of the "parcel as a
whole" approach when analyzing economic impact. This not only
comports with typical views of land ownership but also avoids the problem
of potentially turning all regulations into takings by narrowing the
definition of property./
Indeed, almost all lower courts have treated the
property as a whole when assessing economic impact.20 '
'9' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-3 1.
'94 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
'9sSee id. at 498. In Keystone the Court reviewed a statute, similar to that in Pennsylvania
Coal, which required that coal be kept in the ground to avoid subsidence, problems. Although the
regulated coal companies attempted to segment the property by defining the relevant unit of property as
only that coal subject to regulation, the Court construed the relevant unit of property as including coal
that could be mined. In doing so it emphasized that property is not to be segmented for purposes of
takings analysis, but instead treated as a whole. Id. at 497-99.
' See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 329-31.
197See Id. at 331 (quoting Penn Central).
'98See Id. at 331-32. The Court in Tahoe emphasized that a Lucas categorical taking, based
on loss of all economic viability, occurs only when there is a total taking of the entire parcel. It then
stated that "[a]n interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its geographic
dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest." Id.
'99
2 See Id.
o See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987).
201The nonsegmentation principle is well illustrated by two recent lower court decisions,
K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of NaturalRes., 456 Mich. 570, 575 N.W.2d 531 (1998), and Zealy v. City of
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Evaluating economic impact in this manner, which makes both
conceptual and policy sense, frequently works to avoid a loss of all
economic viability. For example, environmentally sensitive land will often
only be part of a greater parcel of land, as was the case in Palazzolo where
the parcel included several acres of dry "uplands." Even where an entire
parcel might be environmentally sensitive, landowners might be able to get
permits allowing development on some limited portion of the land. Finally,
some prohibitions on all development, such as agricultural zoning, still
permit other economically viable uses.
For these reasons, the Lucas "no economic viability" standard
poses little threat to government land use regulations, even where
protecting environmentally sensitive land. This has been borne out by
lower court decisions subsequent to Lucas, which have consistently rejected
Lucas-type categorical takings whenever at least some economic viability
remains .2 02 For example, in McAssociates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth,2 3 a
state court held that, in order to establish a taking under Lucas, the claimant
has to demonstrate that the property is "substantially useless and stripped..
of all practical value." 2° Other courts have similarly followed the lead of
Lucas itself and limited categorical takings to extreme situations. 20 5
Waukesha, 201 Wis.2d 365, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996). In K&K, the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed a
restriction on four contiguous lots, which were 55, 16, 9 and six acres in size. Although the court of
appeals had segmented the parcels for takings analysis, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, stating
that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of takings jurisprudence is the 'nonsegmentation principle."'
456 Mich. at 578, 575 N.W.2d at 536. The court found the four parcels were bound together through
their continuity, unity of... ownership, and plaintiffrs proposed development plan. Id. at 581, 575
N.W.2d at 537. The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in Zealy, again firmly
applying the nonsegmentation principle. In that case the landowner owned a 10.4 acre parcel zoned
residential/business, of which 8.2 acres were subsequently rezoned to a conservancy district, precluding
any development as to those acres. In rejecting an argument that only the 8.2 acres zoned conservancy
should be considered for the takings analysis, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
consistently held that property must be viewed as a whole. 201 Wis.2d at 375-77, 548 N.W.2d at 53233. On that basis it held that the entire 10.4 acres, including the 2.2 still zoned residential/business,
must be used for evaluating the conservancy restriction's economic impact. Id. at 378, 548 N.W.2d at
533.
202See, e.g, McAssociates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 773 A.2d 439, 443-44 (Me. 2001)
(property must be "substantially useless and stripped ... of all practical value"); K&K Construction,
Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 539 n. 13 (1998) (must deny all or substantially all
practical uses of the property). See also, Glen P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liabilityfor Fifth Amendment Takings ofPrivate Property
Far Outweigh the Rule, 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 948-53 (1999) ("[m]any courts have applied Lucas to deny
compensation for anything less than a total (or virtually total) elimination of value and use"); Ronald H.
Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State
Courts. Does the Supreme Court Really Matter, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 546-48 (1995)
(surveying state courts after Lucas and concluding that "they rarely find" the non economic viability
standard to be met).
203773 A.2d 439 (Me. 2001).
2
4Id at 443.
205See Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (98.8% diminution in
value not a categorical Lucas taking, but instead subject to the Penn Central test); Wonders v. Pima
County, 89 D. 2d 810, 815 (Ariz. App. 2004); Gore v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 444 Mass. 754, 831 N.E.
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As a practical matter, therefore, the first part of the "economic
impact" test, triggered by loss of all economic viability, is limited to
extreme situations. Despite the environmental concern brought on by
Lucas, it poses little threat to land use controls in general, and to controls on
environmentally sensitive land in particular. The only instance in which it
might be triggered is the very rare occurrence where a regulation
completely prohibits development on the totality of a person's property.
Thus, the "denial of economic viability" standard imposes only a very
modest restraint on government regulatory efforts.
2. The Penn Central Test
As noted above, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that, even
when economic viability remains, there might still be a taking under the
Penn Central test. As typically construed, this test requires courts to
consider the economic impact of a regulation, the character of the
government action, and, in particular, the degree of interference with
distinct, investment-backed expectations. Since this test anticipates that
takings might occur even when economic viability remains, it would seem
to have the potential to limit government regulatory efforts.
As a practical matter, however, the Penn Central factors have
rarely resulted in takings being found, and even then in only extreme fact
situations. Although both courts and commentators have often puzzled
over what "interference with investments-backed expectations" means and
how the three factors relate to each other, the bottom line is this: courts
applying the Penn Central balancing test almost always uphold land use
restrictions against takings challenges.
Indeed, a careful analysis of the factors suggests that most
regulatory efforts should be permissible under the Penn Central test.
Although diminution in value is to be considered, the Court in Penn Central
and other courts have stressed that diminution by itself, no matter how
great, is not enough to establish a taking. 20 6 Similarly, the Court's reference
in Penn Centralto character of the government action as a factor seemed to
be in regards to whether it was a physical invasion or mere regulatory
2d 865, 872-73 (2005); Zanghi v. Bd. of AppealS, 807 N.E. 2d 221, 223-24 (Mass. App. 2004); K & K
Construction, Inc. V. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W. 2d 531, 539 n.13 (1998). For a rare example of

where a court says a restriction deprives an owner of all economic viability, see Mehling v. Town of San
Anselmo, 2004 WL 1179428 (Cal. App. 2004). The facts of Mehling are unique, however, in that
neighbors were challenging a city's decision not to enforce a slope density ordinance. The court said the
decision not to enforce the ordinance was justified, since it would deprive the owner of all economic
viability under Lucas, and thus be a categorical taking.
206Penn Central,438 U.S. at 131.
Lower courts have also recognized this principle. See,
e.g., Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 485 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1997) ("mere diminution in value from the
rezoning, even a substantial one, is not compensible."); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593
A.2d 251, 259-60 (N.J. 1991).
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This seems to suggest that an action that is regulatory in nature
action.
raises a presumption of validity.
Thus, the real heart of the Penn Central balancing test would
appear to be the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations.20 8 Even here, however, most land use restrictions would not
pose any constitutional problem. For example, when a landowner seeks
and is denied an upzoning to a more profitable use, there is certainly no
interference with investment-backed expectations. Although refusal to
upzone in such a situation might result in significant loss of potential
appreciated value, this can hardly be viewed as a significant interference
with investment-backed expectations. 2°9 Even where the purchase price
reflects the potential for intensive development, this is speculation on a
possible zoning change and is certainly not the type of investment for which
compensation should be required.°
Similarly, a downzoning of property to a more restrictive use will
usually not be a significant interference with investment-backed
expectations. This is particularly true if the landowner can continue to use
the property as originally intended when acquired. Penn Central essentially
involved this same scenario, in that what had been permitted development
was eliminated, resulting in significant economic impact, but not interfering
with what had been the original expectation of the landowner. 21 ' Lower
2 2
courts have similarly rejected Penn Centralchallenges in such situations.
A cognizable interference with investment-backed expectations
might occur only when property is acquired with fairly crystallized
development expectations consistent with then applicable zoning
regulations, only to have the property subsequently downzoned to a more
restrictive use, resulting in a substantial diminution in value. In such a
situation the landowner's development expectations are arguably backed by
207 Penn

Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

In setting out what has become known as the Penn

Centraltest, the Court said:
Several factors . .. have particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the government action. A "taking"
may be more readily found when the interference can be characterized as physical
invasion, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
2's
See id. (stating that interference with distinct investment-backed expectations was a
"particularlj0r "relevant" factor).
See, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363-64 (II. App.
Ct. 1993); McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 49 P.3d 522
(2002); See also, John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REv. 339, 366-67 (1989);
Oswald, supra note 5 at 115-16.
210 See Oswald supranote 5 at 115-16.
21 See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136.
212 See Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 261 (N.J. 1991).
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an inflated purchase price, and the diminution in value resulting from
downzoning is an interference that arguably constitutes a taking.
The Supreme Court has, however, indicated that this scenario will
not usually be a taking, notwithstanding the interference with purchase
expectations. The Court has consistently affirmed the need to permit newly
enacted land use regulations, 1 3 despite the fact that some purchase
expectations are frustrated. For example, zoning, when first implemented
in any location, necessarily involves restricting previous development
opportunities, which inevitably will affect some recently purchased
property. Yet the Court, in consistently affirming the validity of various
zoning schemes, has never suggested that an interference with purchase
prices in this manner would be unconstitutional.2 14
This idea finds further support in the concept of "regulatory risk," a
theory that helps form the reasonableness of any investment-backed
expectations. The Supreme Court recognized this in Lucas, where it stated,
"It seems to us that the property owner, necessarily expects the use of his
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers ..
,,25
This builds on statements by the Court in other regulatory contexts, in
which it has strongly affirmed the idea that the risk of regulation, including
the distinct possibility of economic loss, is part of economic life. 2 16 The
Court has noted this is particularly true with regard to activities that have
"long been the source of public concern and the subject of government
regulation." 2 17 This is certainly true of land development, which has long
been subject to government regulation, and, if anything, is trending toward
greater controls.
For this reason, reasonable investment expectations about property
based on development potential must necessarily include the possibility that
tighter restrictions might be enacted, depriving the owner of previous
development opportunities and resulting in a diminution of property
213

See Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (newly enacted zoning

restrictions can limit land values without constituting a taking if reasonable); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994) (noting the authority of government to engage in land use planning even
when it diminishes property values); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)
(landowners should reasonably expect some newly enacted regulations that affect land values); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding zoning ordinance valid despite 75% diminution in
value on some land); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("government hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law").
214See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding zoning ordinance did
despite 75% diminution in value on some land).
215See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
216The Court has often said that "[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object
if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." FHA
v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84.91 (1958); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting Darlington).
217 Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984).

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 20 No. I

value. 2 18 Accordingly, purchase prices should be discounted by the
possibility of regulation as a practical matter. Similarly, at least with
undeveloped property, any development expectations should be viewed as
contingent, at best, with the possibility that the government might
subsequently change previous understandings in order to further legitimate
public interests.
For these reasons, the only clear case for a taking under Penn
Central would be where the investment reflects actual development
expenditures, such as constructing facilities or homes, rather than
speculation on future uses. In such a situation the expenditure of money is
almost certainly the type of crystallized investment that Penn Central
intended to protect.21 9 When a landowner actually has spent money
developing land, there is a strong public policy that the landowner
reasonably can expect that the investment is protected.
Otherwise,
incentives for the development of land - critical to our economic well-being
- are jeopardized. Indeed, land-use law has long protected such distinct
development-related investments through vested-rights doctrine, and the
investment-backed expectations factor of Penn Central is most reasonably
understood as engaging at this same point. Thus, Penn Central should be
understood as protecting investment expectations based on actual
development expenditures, absent nuisance-like activity.
A strong argument can be made that takings under Penn Central
should be limited to such interferences with investments in actual
development expenditures. The Supreme Court, however, has implicitly
indicated that, at least in some limited contexts, interferences with
investments on undeveloped land might constitute a taking under Penn
Central.220 However, the totality of the Court's jurisprudence makes it
clear that any reasonable investment-backed expectations must anticipate
further restrictions on property that eliminate previously existing
opportunities and substantially diminish property values.22 ' If nothing else,
this strongly suggests that, at least as regarding future uses on undeveloped
land, takings under Penn Central are to be relatively rare exceptions based
on compelling facts.

218Lower

court decisions have also noted that landowner expectations must include the

possibility of more restrictive enactments. See, e.g., Elias v. Town of Brockhaven, 783 F.Supp. 758
(E.D. N.Y. 1992); Elsmere Park Club Ltdd P'ship v. Town of Elsmere, 771 F.Supp. 646 (D. Del. 1991).
219See Michelman, supra note 142 at 1233-34 (discussing interferences with actual
development expenditures as the type of "distinctly crystallized expectations" that the takings clause
should protect).
220 See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 331,342; Palazzolo, 530 U.S. at 917-18; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019
n.8.

221See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
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Lower court decisions applying Penn Central bear out this
observation, as the courts rarely finding a taking under the Penn Central
analysis. This is true even when the restriction results in a substantial
diminution in value. Indeed, even though there is no automatic cut-off, it
seems fair to say that, generally, diminution in value must substantially
exceed 50%, and should be closer to 90%, before any serious consideration
is given of a Penn Central taking. This observation was made in a recent
Court of Claims decision, Walcek v. United States,222 where the court held
that a 59.7% diminution in value did not constitute a taking under Penn
22 3 In
Central.
reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed a number of
decisions from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and the Court of
Claims in which economic impact and diminution in value had been
considered. It noted that, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has
suggested diminutions in value "approaching 85 to 90 percent do not
necessarily" constitute a taking.224 Similarly, the Court of Claims generally
"relied on diminutions well in excess of 85 percent before finding a
regulatory taking. 22 5 It noted that both the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit had rejected takings challenges based on the degree of diminution in
value present in Walcek, which was about 60%.226
These observations are supported by other decisions that have also
rejected takings challenges despite a substantial diminution in value. These
have not always been predicated on the Penn Central analysis, since, prior
to Palazzolo, some lower courts ignored it if economic viability existed.
Yet, to the extent economic diminution in value was considered in these
cases, courts have consistently sustained land use restrictions despite
substantial economic impacts.
22249

Fed. Cl. 248 (2001), affd 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
id.at 271-72.
Id. at 271 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding a
zoning ordinance valid despite a 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915) (finding no taking despite an 87.5% diminution in value)).
223 Id. at 271 (citing Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990)
(finding a
99% diminution was a taking), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.
Cl. 37, 48-49 (1994) (finding a 92-100% diminution was a taking); Formananek v. United States, 26 Cl.
Ct. 332, 340 (1992) (finding an 88% diminution was a taking). See also, David F. Courson, The
Takings Jurisprudenceof the Court of FederalClaims and the FederalCircuit,29 ENvTL. L. 821, 848
(1999) (stating that Federal Court of Claims and Federal Circuit seemed to have evolved a de facto
takings threshold
of roughly ninety percent in value in wetlands cases).
226
See Walcek, 49 Fed. Ct. at 271.
227See Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrausbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d1 Cir. 1987) (finding
that a property reduced in value from $495,600 to $52,000 was not a taking); Nasser v. City of
Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 438 (11 th Cir. 1982) (finding a 53% diminution in value was not a taking);
William C. Hass & Co. v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding no taking
with a 95% diminution in value); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (78% and 92% diminution in value in two leases did not constitute a taking under Penn Central
analysis); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Burough of Berardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1386-90 (1992)
(finding no taking with a 90% diminution in value). But see, Friedenburg v. New York State Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation, 3 A.D. 3d 86, 767 N.Y.S. 2d 451 (2003) (taking under Penn Central where 95%
diminution in value).
223See
224
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Similarly, those lower courts that have explicitly applied Penn
Central have almost without exception found restrictions to be valid. In
doing so, they have at times noted that the landowner took the property with
knowledge of the restriction, thus negating or at least minimizing
interference with investment-backed expectations.228 Where restrictions
were imposed after acquisition of the property, courts have noted, as the
Supreme Court did in Lucas, that reasonable expectations need to include
the possibility of further restrictions.22 9 Moreover, courts have evaluated
the restriction's impact on the parcel as a whole, noting that a number of
230
uses remain.
B. The Policies SupportingDeferentialReview
As suggested in the previous subsection, current takings
jurisprudence draws a sharp distinction between restrictions on current uses
where actual development expenditures have been made and restrictions on
potential uses of land. In the relatively rare instance where a land use
regulation interferes with substantial development expenditures, the Penn
Central test would likely find an interference with investment-backed
expectations constituting a taking, absent a nuisance-like activity. In
contrast, in the far more common scenario where potential uses are
restricted, takings occur only in very extreme situations. Although some
view recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence as re-striking the balance
more in favor of property owner's rights, the adjustment is minor and only
at the edges.
As suggested above, the policy protecting landowner property
rights when actual development expenditures occur is relatively
straightforward. When a landowner actually has spent money developing
land, there is a strong public policy that the landowner reasonably can
expect that the investment is protected. Otherwise, incentives for the
m See, e.g., Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 261 (N.J. 1991); K &
K Construction v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2005 WL 1753805 (Mich. App. 2005); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
City of Highland Park, 344 ll.App. 3d 259, 278 Ill. Dec 716, 932-33 (2003); Town of Georgetown v.
Sewell, 786 N.E.2d 1132, 1141 (Ind. App. 2003) ("[pl]roperty owners are charged with knowledge of
relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of their property").
2See Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(investment-backed expectations shaped by regulatory scheme in place at time purchased property and
likelihood of further restrictions); Gore v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals, 444 Mass. 754, 831 N.E. 2d 865,
873-75 (2005); Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S. W. 3d 660, 677-79 (Tex. 2004)
(downzoning not a taking, despite 50% decrease in value, where property had still appreciated in value);
Town of Georgetown v. Sewell, 786 N.E. 2d 1132, 1140-41 (Ind. App. 2003). But see Ala. Dep't of
Transp. v. Land Energy, Ltd., 886 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 2004) (finding taking of mineral rights under Penn
Central).

2" See, e.g., City of Coeur D'Alene v. Simpson, 2005 WL 286936 (2005); K & K Constr. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2005 WL1753805 (Mich. App. 2005); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Highland
Park, 344 Ill. App. 3d 259,278 Il. Dec. 916,926-29 (2003).
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development of land - critical to our economic and social well-being - are
jeopardized. 23 Not only would interference with such investments appear
unfair, but, as noted by Frank Michelman, the demoralization costs would
be enormous.2 32 This would lead to an underutilization of resources and a
disincentive to produce housing and other land uses critical to meeting
societal needs. It is not surprising that the law, although not as developed
in this area, strongly suggests that landowners' expectations should be
protected in these situations.
Such restrictions on established uses are extremely rare, however.
The vast majority of land use controls restrict potential, not established,
uses, often on undeveloped land. The Court's jurisprudence weighs heavily
in favor of the government's ability to restrict potential uses of land, even
when it results in substantial diminution in value. The real question,
therefore, is this: Why draw the balance so heavily in favor of government
regulatory interests rather than private property owners' use rights? In
particular, why not find a taking when land use regulations result in a
substantial, though not complete, economic loss on a landowner? This is
particularly true when environmental regulations impose substantial
restrictions on development opportunity, resulting in significant economic
loss when compared to the value of unrestricted land. The concern is
exacerbated when the benefits of the regulation go to society as a whole,
with a few private property owners carrying most of the burden.
One answer is that offered by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal, who stated that government could not go on if it had to pay every
time its regulations reduced the value of land.233 Thus, although the Court
acknowledged that a regulation's economic impact could be so great as to
be a taking, pragmatic concerns require that landowners tolerate some
economic loss for societal good. Underlying this idea is the presumption
that some degree of government regulation of land is both necessary and
good - a presumption that is defensible on several grounds. Governmental
regulatory efforts promote the common good, of which the affected
landowners are a part. To enjoy the benefits of government regulation, one
must also bear the burden.
Justice Holmes' observation arguably touches on one-half of the
balance supporting the Court's deferential review with regard to land use
regulations, which is the perceived value of the regulations themselves.
Land use restrictions are typically justified by reference to two related
concepts: minimizing land conflicts posed by incompatible uses and
231See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the
New Takings Legislation. 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 267-68 (1995); John A. Humbach, Law and a
New Land Ethic, 74 MtNN. L. REV. 339, 347 (1989).
232See Michelman, Just Compensation,supra note 142 at 1214-16.
233Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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avoiding misallocation of land uses resulting from market externalities.
The coordinating function of zoning is perceived to increase land values
and enjoyment by avoiding, or at least minimizing, land conflicts that
would otherwise exist.234 The avoidance of such conflicts enhances the use
and enjoyment of land, thus increasing its value. It also encourages
investment in land development, since landowners can be reasonably
confident that incompatible uses will not locate nearby.
A second rationale supporting zoning is its help in minimizing
externalities that lead to market misallocations of land resources. In a
perfect world, the market itself, through pricing mechanisms, would reach
the best use of land that will maximize societal welfare.235 As is frequently
noted, however, market participants often fail to consider harms or benefits
from their decisions that do not directly affect them and are therefore
external to the decision making process.2 36 For example, a landowner
might decide that a particular tract of land is best used for commercial
purposes, not considering the harmful effect of increased traffic on the
neighbors. This externality might lead to a misallocation of the land in
question, since, from a broader societal perspective, the land is best used for
non-commercial purposes when the harm to the neighbors is considered.
Externalities are particularly problematic with regard to
environmentally sensitive land, such as wetlands, coastal zones, habitat for
endangered species, and farmland. From a societal perspective, these
properties are often best kept in their natural or undeveloped state because
of a variety of benefits they create for society. Wetlands, for example,
provide society with benefits such as water purification, flood control, and
wildlife habitat. 237 From the landowner's perspective, however, wetlands
are almost always more valuable drained, filled, and developed. Most of
the other benefits go to society broadly rather than directly to the
landowner. In a market decision, those benefits would be external to the
landowner's decision-making, resulting in loss of the societal resource.
Governmental regulation is necessary to address the externality problem
and to prevent misallocation of the resource.
The takings clause, though, is primarily not about economic
efficiency, but about fairness. Even if public policy strongly supports
restricting land use for the public good, which it certainly does, it does not
answer the question - central to takings analysis - about why it is fair to
234See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926) (discussing the
various types
235 of land use conflicts that zoning minimizes or prevents).
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER & JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND

DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 11-17 (5"' ed. 2001).
236See id.
231 ROBERT V.

PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY 673-74 (4"' ed. 2003).
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impose the cost of such restrictions on private landowners, which the
Court's current deferential approach does. Thus, the ultimate takings
concern, often emphasized by the Court, "is to prevent some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole., 23 ' And, as suggested in Pennsylvania Coal, the
mere fact that government interests are important is not enough, by itself, to
justify what would otherwise be an unfair burden on landowners.239
Therefore, the ultimate question from a policy perspective is why the
imposition of substantial economic losses on individual landowners is not
unfair.
Imposing substantial economic costs on property owners to achieve
broader societal objectives, as could happen with restrictions on
environmentally sensitive land, might seem unfair. 24 0 In particular, it might
seem that property owners are forced to give up substantial property
interests in order to bestow benefits on the rest of society. Whatever the
importance of the government interest in seeking the efficient use of land
and preserving critical resources, it is unfair to require private landowners
to bear the cost of such preservation.
Although this has some intuitive appeal, it is overstated for several
reasons. Indeed, from a broad perspective, requiring that landowners bear
the cost of most regulatory efforts, even those imposing substantial
diminution in potential land values, is both fair and sensible. As such, the
balance drawn by the Court with regard to general restrictions on land use
is supported by sound policy, since it achieves the important societal benefit
of government regulation without being unfair to landowners. The next two
subsections will briefly review three reasons why such regulations should
241
not be viewed as unfair.

238 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); See also, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (quoting Armstrong); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994)
(quoting Armstrong); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting
Armstrong). Scholars have also often stated that "fairness" is at the center of the takings issue. See e.g.,

WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 6 (1995); Michelman,

supra note 142 at 1171-72.
239The Court in Pennsylvania Coal implicitly conceded the often important interests served
by land use regulations, see 260 U.S. at 413, but clearly established that at some point the power to
regulate crosses from police power to eminent domain, requiring payment of just compensation if
government wants to pursue those interests. See id.at 416.
See Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"EnvironmentalTakings," 46 S.C. L. REV. 613,636 (1995).
241The discussion in these two subsections, and in particular the arguments
why imposing
substantial diminution on landowners is not necessarily unfair, is drawn from several previous law
review articles I have written. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings, Fairness,and FarmlandPreservation,60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1033, 1072-81 (1999); Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution:The Rise of State
Takings Legislation,24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187,229-38 (1997).
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1. Property Rights and Landowner Expectations
An initial response to concerns about unfair regulatory burdens
concerns the nature of property rights and landowner expectations. The
argument that substantial diminution of potential land values is unfair is in
part predicated on the idea that private property ownership includes the
right to use the property as the owner chooses. Thus, land use restrictions
that significantly reduce development options are viewed as forcing
landowners to forego opportunities that are interwoven into their rights as
property owners. The forced loss of what are viewed as normal property
rights without compensation is seen as unfair.
However, as a number of legal commentators have noted, such a
perspective is neither the traditional nor the proper way to view property
rights.242 Rather, our legal system has long recognized that private property
ownership is subject to a broader public interest. 243 Such recognition of a
public interest in privately owned land is not a recent invention of the
Supreme Court, but rather traces its origins back to the beginning of our
country and is a consistent theme in property law. It is clearly reflected in
the sic utere principle of nuisance law, which states that a person cannot use
his or her land in such a way as to harm the property rights of others.
Beyond that, courts have long held that use of private property is subject to
the common good and to public rights.
This sentiment was expressed in several early cases where private
land use conflicted with public interests, typically with shared resources
such as air and water.244 Courts consistently recognized that private
interests were not absolute and must yield to public interests when conflicts
arise. This recognition of inherent limits on private property interests is
similarly seen in the widespread growth and acceptance of land use
242See,

e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation,Not a Lockean Soliloquy:

A Rule for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095 (1996); Carol M.
Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Private Property, Public Rights and the New Takings Legislation, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996).
243A number of commentators have noted that private property must necessarily be viewed
as subject to certain public rights or interests. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations:
Toward a "Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REv. 529, 535 (1989) (treating private
property rights "as a balance between social and individual interests" is the most appropriate way to
solve the as yet unresolved debate as to the meaning of the takings clause as it relates to private
property); Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving; PolicePower, Public Value, and PrivateRight, 26 ENVTL.
L. 1 (1996) (emphasizing "social function of property"); John A. Humbach, Law and the New Land
Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 344-48 (stating that "legal property rights are shaped and limited by the
many competing needs of the general welfare").
244See Commonwealth v. Ager, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52
Mass. (I I Met.) 55 (1846). For a discussion of Alger, Tewksbury, and other early cases recognizing a
public interest in private property, see Duncan, supra note 242. See also, Leslie Bender, The Takings
Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 735, 751-52 (1985) (discussing restrictions on
perceived noxious activity in early America).
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restrictions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In
recognizing the validity of such restrictions, courts also recognized that
property rights are not absolute but are necessarily limited by the broader
good. The Supreme Court itself recognized this principle in a number of
decisions during this period, frequently stating that property use was limited
by public interests.24 5
This principle that private property is subject to broader social
concerns has often been referred to as the social function of property. 246 It
reflects the fundamental concept that property is a social construct and that
society can legitimately define the extent of private property interests to be
limited by social concerns. Construing property interests in this manner
recognizes that the consequences of property use often extend beyond land
boundaries and will often conflict with other social needs, necessitating a
reasonable accommodation of interests.
It is important to emphasize that this accommodation between
private and public interests is an inherent limitation in the nature of private
property to begin with, rather than a deprivation of interests. The balance
the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence has drawn in this area is
therefore quite consistent with how property interests are defined in the first
place.
2. Accounting for Givings and Reciprocity
A second reason why it is not necessarily unfair to restrict private
property to serve public interests, even when it results in a substantial loss
in value, is that much of that value was the result of public, as opposed to
private, activity.
This is often known as the "givings" argument,
highlighting the fact that government often gives significant value to land
as well as takes it away. 247 As such, the extent of the true loss is often far
less than it might appear to be, lessening fairness concerns.
245See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, (1922) ("As long recognized some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power."); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's
use of it shall not be injurious to the community"); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCanter, 209 U.S.
349, 355 (1908) (private property limited by other public interests, including exercise of police power
"to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests"); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410
(1915) (private property interests must at times "yield to the good of the community" for the sake of
"progress").
246See Torres, supra note 243 at 5.
247For discussion of givings, see Daniel D. Bamhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public
Acquisition of PrivatePropertyInterests on the Coasts, 27 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 295 (2003); Mark W.
Cordes, Takings, Fairness,andFarmlandPreservation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1033, 1072-77 (1999); Mark
W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
187, 234-36 (1997); Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar./Apr. 1994 at
22; See also, PrivatePropertyRights and EnvironmentalLaws: HearingBefore the Senate Comm 'n on
the Env't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 163, 163-65 (1995) (statement of C. Ford Runge, Professor, Dept.
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Government actions frequently add value to land in numerous
ways, such as mortgage interest deductions.
Land use restrictions
themselves often enhance land values by minimizing the harms that might
otherwise affect landowners, especially those arising from incompatible
land uses. For example, the increased value of environmentally sensitive
land in alternative, residential use in part exists because government zoning
would protect any residential development from conflicting commercial and
industrial uses. Thus, the very scheme of restricting property can add
significant value to neighboring property.
Perhaps the most obvious example of government givings in the
context of land development is basic infrastructure support that makes land
developable. Almost any infrastructure support, such as sewer lines and
public facilities, adds significant value to land by making necessary
services available to the property. Although property owners today often
pay for some infrastructure through exactions, such exactions reflect the
cost of the infrastructure and not the value it adds to the property.248 More
significantly, exactions do not attempt to recover the broader infrastructure
support, such as roads, that makes land developable and without which
commercial value would be negligible.2 49
250
Closely related to givings is the concept of "general reciprocity.'
The Supreme Court itself has often spoken of the idea of an "average
reciprocity of advantage" in its takings cases. 251' This usually refers to the
fact that the same regulation that imposes regulatory burdens on property
might also create reciprocal benefits. For example, a broadly applicable
land use restriction to single-family use will limit previously existing
development opportunities on a particular parcel of land, but it will also
impose similar limitations on surrounding parcels. Thus, each owner loses
something (the previous opportunity to develop) and gains something (the
benefits of similar restrictions on neighboring land).
of Agric. & Applied Econ., Univ. of Minn.) (discussing various ways government actions enhance
private property values).
248 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality"
between exaction and development impact).
249The potential impact of government givings on land value can be illustrated by a simple
example. Assume a property owner has a tract of remote land worth $10,000. The government then
puts in a major highway near the property, creating new commercial opportunities and raising the total
value to $60, 000. A short time later, the government imposes an environmental restriction on the
property, decreasing its value to $30,000. Although it might initially appear that the government actions
diminished property values by as much as 50 / in this example, in fact the cumulative effect was to
increase value by threefold.
2'0
See Cordes, FarmlandPreservation,supra note 241 at 1075-77; Cordes, Leapfroggingthe
Constitution, supranote 241 at 236-37.
252See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Council, 535 U.S. 302,
341 (2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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The Supreme Court's own invocation of "average reciprocity of
advantage" typically refers to this specific reciprocity flowing from the
challenged restriction. Reciprocity can also be viewed from the broader
perspective of "general reciprocity." General reciprocity refers to the
economic benefits of regulation in general, rather than the challenged
restriction, which from a broader perspective help to secure "an average
reciprocity of advantage" to participants in the American economy. Thus,
although a particular regulation might decrease the value of an owner's
property, that same owner also benefits from numerous other regulations
that restrict other parties. These might include flood plain restrictions and
environmental regulations on neighboring lands, as well as various
economic and social regulations that benefit citizens.
As noted by Larry Libby, the tendency is to accept the benefits of
regulation as a given but complain about the burdens as an infringement of
rights.2 52 That perspective distorts the true accounting of regulatory
impacts by focusing on only half of the equation. Any true discussion of
fairness must consider the myriad benefits accruing to landowners from
economic regulations, as well as their inevitable burdens. This is not meant
to suggest that we are all financial winners based on overall regulatory
impact. However, the concept of general reciprocity does demonstrate that
diminution in value resulting from property restrictions is not necessarily
unfair. Rather, the fairness or unfairness of economic impacts must be
decided with a broader perspective that also considers the many regulatory
benefits that accrue to landowners.25 3
These policy considerations help explain the Court's deferential
approach to takings based on economic impact, in which the balance
between government and individual is weighed heavily in favor of
government. 4 On one hand, the broader public interest served by land use
restrictions is substantial, including development restrictions on
environmentally sensitive land. On the other hand, the costs imposed on
effected landowners by such restrictions are not nearly as great as they may
252See

Lawrence W. Libby, Property Rights - The Public-PrivateBalance?,MSU LAND USE

FORUM CONF. Jan. 9-10, 1996 at 93, 98.
253This

point was also made in Professor Frank Michelman's seminal law review article on

takings, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foudnationsof "Just Compensation
Law, "80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967):

Efficiency - motivated collective measures will regularly inflict on countless
people

disproportionate

burdens

which cannot practicably

be

erased

by

compensation settlements, In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to
believe that we can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance over time the

burdens associated with collectively determined improvements will have been
distributed "evenly" enough so that everyone will be a net gainer.
Id. at 1225 (emphasis in original).
254For a recent criticism of the types of "givings" and reciprocity arguments presented in the
text, see Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Downzoning, Fairnessand FarmlandPreservation, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 59 (2003). For my response, see Mark W. Cordes, Fairnessand FarmlandPreservation:A
Response to ProfessorRichardson, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 371 (2005).
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appear. Private property rights have always included implied limitations
for the public good and any investment in land must anticipate "regulatory
risk." Moreover, the economic loss in value that at times accompany such
restrictions are partially offset by government "givings" and reciprocal
benefits imposed on surrounding property. Ultimately, the fairness or
unfairness of any specific regulation must also be understood in a broader
regulatory context in which other regulatory measures likely benefit a
particular landowner.
VI. CONCLUSION

Takings law remains, if not a mess, at least somewhat messy. The
Court's focus on ad hoc balancing to decide most takings cases inevitably
results in some uncertainty. In Lingle, the Court conceded its current
approach results in a number of "vexing questions. 2 55 Moreover, despite
the number of takings cases decided in the past quarter century, the Court
still has not clearly defined some of its most fundamental concepts, leaving
lower courts feeling their way through the dark on some issues.
Yet the big picture of takings is shaping up rather nicely.
Ultimately, takings jurisprudence concerns the balance of community rights
and individual rights in the use and control of property. In striking the
balance between government and individual, the Court has recognized three
distinct types of takings concerns and three analytical approaches in
resolving them. In turn, these three analytical approaches loosely represent
three levels of judicial review: takings based on physical invasions are
subject to a type of strict scrutiny, in which the government action is near
per se invalid; takings based on exactions are subject to intermediate
review; and takings based on a land use regulation's economic impact are
subject to what in effect amounts to deferential review, permitting
government substantial latitude in controlling land use.
Of these three characterizations, the one that might appear the most
surprising is viewing the Court's economic impact analysis under Lucas
and Penn Central as a type of deferential review. Not only do the tests
involve a level of factual inquiry and balancing typically not associated
with deferential review, but many perceive the Court in recent years as
more aggressively protecting property rights in this area. Yet, when viewed
from a broad perspective, there is little doubt that the Court's economic
impact analysis used for most land use restrictions is highly deferential to
government in regulating land for the public good. When closely
examined, the Lucas and Penn Central tests themselves are structured in a
255Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005).
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way to find takings in relatively rare circumstances. This has been borne
out by lower court decisions under the Lucas and Penn Centralframework,
with takings rarely being found.
Finally, the balance struck by the Court for these three types of
takings is quite sensible and strongly supported by policy rationales. Strict
scrutiny for physical invasions reflects the high value placed on the right to
exclude, the protection of which is essential to the efficient use of the land
resource and preserving individual autonomy and privacy. Intermediate
review for exactions reflects the legitimate role that exactions serve in the
land development process, while at the same time seeking to police the very
real abuses that can occur in their implementation. Deferential review for
takings based on economic impact reflects that land use cannot be viewed
in isolation, but as part of a broader community of interests. Therefore, the
economic impact that often accompanies land use restrictions, especially on
environmentally sensitive land, must be seen in a broader context in which
economic loss is in part offset by government givings and other regulatory
benefits. More fundamentally, deferential review for takings based on
economic impact recognizes that private property rights necessarily include
implied limitations for the public good.

